Sea vessels

It calls at the ports of the TOT of Crimea (Ukraine), in particular, delivering products from Turkey. In particular, on 20 April 2024, the vessel entered the temporarily occupied Sevastopol, moored at berth 20 of Avlita (opposite the grain terminal) at coordinates: 33.5496, 44.6256. The vessel arrived from the Turkish port of Bartin, where it was loaded on 14-17 April 2024. The AIS signal was switched off between 17 and 26 April 2024. Thus, the vessel made a direct voyage from Turkey with cargo to the TOT of Crimea, which is a violation of Turkish Circular 635/2017 and International Maritime Organization Resolution 1183.

It calls at the ports of Crimea (Ukraine), a cargo transshipment area in the Kerch Strait. In particular, on 04 June 2024, the vessel was in the temporarily occupied closed port of Sevastopol, the AIS system was switched off during the port call. The vessel is owned and operated by Nika Shipping LLC, a company established under russian law in April 2023 and registered in the TOT of Donetsk region (Donetsk).

It is allegedly involved in a scheme to steal Ukrainian grain from the TOT of Ukraine. Between 22 and 26 September 2023, after approaching the Kerch Strait in the Black Sea, the vessel switched off its AIS transponder and continued to move towards the Sea of Azov, where it docked with the vessel STK-1003 (IMO 8326058) to load grain of Ukrainian origin, which had been exported from the temporarily occupied port of Mariupol. After that, the ‘SH Express’ vessel proceeded to deliver the grain to the port of Tripoli (Lebanon). At the same time, there are signs of links between this vessel and russian/related entities through the management of the vessel. The commercial manager of the ‘SH Express’ vessel is Romarine Europe Ltd, a company registered in Liberia, with an office in Greece at the following address: 1st Floor, 11, Agiou Spyridonos Street, 185 35, Piraeus. At the same time, this company also operates another vessel, the ‘Bella’ (IMO 8418356), which has repeatedly called at the seaports of the TOT of Crimea in violation of Ukrainian legislation. In particular, in August 2019, the vessel ‘Bella’ was moored at the grain terminal of the stevedoring company ‘Avlita’ in the closed port of Sevastopol, where the vessel was loaded, and subsequently sailed to Libya. The vessel ‘Bella’ was also involved in the export of grain from the port of Sevastopol (TOT Crimea) to Syria with the AIS signal switched off, the delivery of ilmenite to the port of Feodosia (TOT Crimea), and the export of grain from the ports of Kerch and Sevastopol to Greece.

During the period of the G7 and EU crude oil embargo and the price-cap policy on russian crude oil, the tanker is involved in the export of russian oil to third countries from russian ports, including with the AIS system disabled. The owner, manager, and commercial manager of the vessel since the end of January 2024 is Rahad Maritime Corp., whose fleet consists of this vessel only. The ISM-manager of the vessel since the end of March 2024 is Beacon Ship Management. The tanker is certified by the Indian regulator Indian Register of Shipping (IACS). The tanker 'JUMBO' is affiliated with the Indian company Gatik Ship Management, one of the leading operators of the so-called 'shadow fleet', which has become the largest carrier of russian oil under sanctions since the beginning of the full-scale war against Ukraine. Tankers operated/managed by India's Gatik Ship Management continue to be used by related companies and call at russian ports. As sanctions are being imposed, russia uses a scheme of "juggling" ships between related companies to conceal oil exports outside the price cap and other restrictions, as well as to hide the real owners of ships, and to ensure unimpeded transportation of fossil fuels by a 'shadow' fleet of obsolete oil tankers, creates new companies for these purposes (in the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Turkey, Mauritius, Seychelles, and other jurisdictions) with non-transparent organizational and ownership structures. In order to implement this scheme, technical/commercial management and ship owners are constantly changing, and vessels are renamed with a change of flag, MMSI, call-sign, including for sanctioned vessels. Shadow fleet vessels operate under “convenient flags”, which allows them to conceal their true origin and avoid control by international organizations and insurance companies. Almost all vessels that are involved in the transportation of russian oil by the shadow fleet since 2022 have been certified by the Indian regulator Indian Register of Shipping (IACS). The certification of shadow fleet vessels allows the shipowner/operator to insure the vessels, which, in turn, allows the vessels to enter ports and pass through various specific sea routes (straits, canals, etc.). The 'shadow' fleet, transporting huge volumes of crude oil through heavily trafficked routes through narrow straits close to the coastline, without proper P&I insurance, with automatic identification systems disabled, threatens an environmental disaster with significant economic costs to be borne by the affected coastal countries and/or the international community. The recent incidents off Malaysia only underscore the need for swift action to curb the potentially devastating impact of the growing 'shadow fleet'. 'Shadow' tankers have already been involved in 50 incidents from the Danish Straits all the way to Malaysia since russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to CREA, from January to August 2024, the number of shadow tankers crossing the Danish Straits in Europe increased by 277% compared to the same period in 2022, with 64% of the 46 million tons of russian marine oil transported through the Danish Straits being transported by shadow tankers. In the same period, the number of shadow tankers in the Straits of Dover and Gibraltar increased by 355% compared to 2022, transporting 67% of the 37 million tons of oil through the straits. The Suez Canal experienced a staggering 649% increase in shadow tanker traffic, with 69% of the 52 million tons of russian crude oil passing through it being transported by these vessels. Thus, the 'shadow fleet' of the russian federation continues to provide multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin bypassing sanctions, disguising its activities under the flags of third countries, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant threats to environmental safety with significant economic costs for coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequate insurance of shadow fleet tankers.

It calls at the ports of Crimea (Ukraine) with the AIS signal turned off. In particular, on 13 March 2024, the vessel entered Sevastopol Bay with the AIS signal switched off to conceal its entry into the closed port of the TOT of Crimea. To avoid sanctions, the vessel's AIS signal has been switched off since 13 October 2023. Back in July 2012, the vessel was arrested by Georgia for calling at the russian-occupied port of Sukhumi (Abkhazia).

The tanker is designed to operate at Yamal LNG, the first large-capacity project of NOVATEK's subsidiary, ensuring year-round export of gas condensate via the Northern Sea Route from the Sabetta LNG terminal to Europe and Asia. Stable gas condensate (SGC) serves as a feedstock for the production of gasoline, gasoil, jet fuel and diesel fuel. The leading russian players in the stable gas condensate market are GAZPROM, IRKUTSK OIL COMPANY, NOVATEK, RUSNEFT, YAMAL LNG and YATEK. The volume of stable gas condensate exports in 2023 amounted to 4526.6 thousand tons. The largest share of exports in 2023 was taken by: “GAZPROM, NOVATEK and YAMAL LNG. In 2024, Yamal LNG LLC was the exporter of gas condensate to the EU market. According to export operations, in 2024, the company supplied more than $234 million worth of gas condensate to the EU. The growth in gas condensate exports from russia to the EU is due, in particular, to the absence of sanctions restrictions on russian gas condensate. The application of restrictions to russian gas condensate and/or vessels involved in its transportation will force russia to look for new markets/storage facilities, which will disrupt its technological processes and lead to additional costs for russia.

During the period of the G7 embargo and price-cap policy on russian oil, the tanker is involved in the export of russian oil from the russian ports of Kozmino, Ust-Luga, Primorsk, mainly to China and India. The gross tonnage of the tanker is 57.68 thousand tons. The vessel is certified by the Korean Register (IACS). The oil tanker is affiliated with Shanghai Future Ship Management Co LTD (China). This company managed the Panamanian-flagged MT Freya, which, together with the Iranian-flagged MT Horse, owned by the National Iranian Tanker Company (a subsidiary of the sanctioned National Iranian Oil Company), was arrested by Indonesia in January 2021 on suspicion of illegal oil transportation in the country's waters. The tanker 'NURKEZ' calls at russian ports, which are the leaders among the ports from which russian oil is exported by the shadow fleet - the ports of Ust-Luga, Primorsk in the Baltic Sea, Novorossiysk in the Black Sea, delivering oil to the countries that import the most russian crude oil through the shadow fleet - China, India. The tanker is flying the flag of Panama, which, along with Liberia, Gabon, the Cook Islands, and the Marshall Islands, is the leader in the flags under which shadow tankers carrying russian oil are flying. The shadow fleet, transporting huge volumes of crude oil through heavily trafficked routes through narrow straits close to the coastline, without proper P&I insurance, with automatic identification systems disabled, threatens an environmental disaster with significant economic costs to be borne by the affected coastal countries and/or the international community. The recent incidents off Malaysia only underscore the need for swift action to curb the potentially devastating impact of the growing shadow fleet. 'Shadow' tankers have already been involved in 50 incidents from the Danish Straits all the way to Malaysia since russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to CREA, from January to August 2024, the number of shadow tankers crossing the Danish Straits in Europe increased by 277% compared to the same period in 2022, with 64% of the 46 million tons of russian marine oil transported through the Danish Straits being transported by shadow tankers. In the same period, the number of shadow tankers in the Straits of Dover and Gibraltar increased by 355% compared to 2022, transporting 67% of the 37 million tons of oil through the straits. The Suez Canal experienced a staggering 649% increase in shadow tanker traffic, with 69% of the 52 million tons of russian crude oil passing through it being transported by these vessels. Thus, russia's 'shadow fleet' continues to generate multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin bypassing sanctions, disguising its activities under the flags of third countries, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant environmental safety threats with significant economic costs to coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequate insurance of shadow fleet tankers.

The vessel is involved in the transportation of russian crude oil during the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and price-cap policy on russian oil to third countries. The vessel, through its related companies, including Stream Ship Management FZCO, is affiliated with the sanctioned PJSC Sovcomflot, the largest state-owned shipping company in russia, a key company for servicing and supporting offshore hydrocarbon production, transportation of russian oil, oil products and liquefied natural gas amid sanctions restrictions on russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The services provided by Sovcomflot are a significant source of income for the russian federation, as more than 70% of russia's revenues come from energy sales, which allows it to finance its war against Ukraine. The main charterers of Sovcomflot's vessels are russia's largest oil and gas companies and traders. Sovcomflot is involved in servicing major oil and gas projects in russia: ‘’Sakhalin 1‘’, ‘’Sakhalin 2‘’, ‘’Varandey‘’, ‘’Prirazlomnoye‘’, ‘’Novy Port‘’, ‘’Yamal LNG‘’ and others. Prior to russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the company's fleet consisted of about 145 vessels. After the imposition of sanctions, Sovcomflot transferred dozens of vessels to the ownership of companies it had set up, including in foreign jurisdictions, in order to circumvent them, and began the practice of constantly ‘juggling’ (transferring) vessels to related companies. The tankers ‘re-registered’ by Sovcomflot to related companies, according to expert estimates, are part of the so-called ‘shadow tanker fleet’ of the russian federation to continue selling russian oil, oil products and liquefied gas under western sanctions. On 11 September 2024, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on 10 oil tankers (including the ‘Nikolay Zuyev’) related to the transportation of oil or oil products from russia to third countries.

It makes regular calls to/from the ports of the TOT of Crimea (Sevastopol, Kerch). In particular, on 23 January 2024, the tanker made a return passage from Kamyshov Bay to Sevastopol Bay, where it entered on 22 January 2024. On 24 January 2024, the vessel was visually detected leaving Sevastopol Bay. On 21 March 2024, the tanker entered Sevastopol Bay with its AIS signal switched off (according to AIS data, the vessel arrived from the russian port of Temryuk).

The vessel is involved in the export of russian oil from the port of Novorossiysk in the Black Sea to Turkish ports during the G7 and EU oil embargo and price-car policy. The vessel is also involved in transshipment of russian oil in the area of several dozen nautical miles southeast of the port of Constanta (Romania) through bunkering with the tanker ‘New Trust’ (IMO 9274812), affiliated with the Greek company New Shipping Ltd, which, in turn, is involved in bunkering with russian tankers exporting oil products from russian ports in the Black Sea. Thus, the vessel has been bunkering at sea near the port of Constanta, in particular with the tankers ‘Dmitry Pokrovsky’, ‘VF Tanker 3’, ‘VF Tanker 4’, ‘Caspian Stream’, ‘Andropov’, which sailed from the ports of Temryuk and Novorossiysk. The company also docked with the tanker ‘Uluc Ka’, which came from the port of Marmara Ereğlisi (Turkey) and, after docking, returned to the Sea of Marmara and called at the port of Istanbul.

The vessel is involved in the transportation of russian crude oil during the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and price-cap policy on russian oil to third countries. The vessel, through its related companies, including Stream Ship Management FZCO, is affiliated with the sanctioned PJSC Sovcomflot, the largest state-owned shipping company in russia, a key company for servicing and supporting offshore hydrocarbon production, transportation of russian oil, oil products and liquefied natural gas amid sanctions restrictions on russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The services provided by Sovcomflot are a significant source of income for the russian federation, as more than 70% of russia's revenues come from energy sales, which allows it to finance its war against Ukraine. The main charterers of Sovcomflot's vessels are russia's largest oil and gas companies and traders. Sovcomflot is involved in servicing major oil and gas projects in russia: ‘’Sakhalin 1‘’, ‘’Sakhalin 2‘’, ‘’Varandey‘’, ‘’Prirazlomnoye‘’, ‘’Novy Port‘’, ‘’Yamal LNG‘’ and others. Prior to russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the company's fleet consisted of about 145 vessels. After the imposition of sanctions, Sovcomflot transferred dozens of vessels to the ownership of companies it had set up, including in foreign jurisdictions, in order to circumvent them, and began the practice of constantly ‘juggling’ (transferring) vessels to related companies. The tankers ‘re-registered’ by Sovcomflot to related companies, according to expert estimates, are part of the so-called ‘shadow tanker fleet’ of the russian federation to continue selling russian oil, oil products and liquefied gas under western sanctions. On 11 September 2024, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on 10 oil tankers (including the ‘Ns Clipper’) related to the transportation of oil or oil products from russia to third countries.

The vessel is involved in the transportation of russian crude oil during the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and price-cap policy on russian oil to third countries. The vessel, through its related companies, including Stream Ship Management FZCO, is affiliated with the sanctioned PJSC Sovcomflot, the largest state-owned shipping company in russia, a key company for servicing and supporting offshore hydrocarbon production, transportation of russian oil, oil products and liquefied natural gas amid sanctions restrictions on russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The services provided by Sovcomflot are a significant source of income for the russian federation, as more than 70% of russia's revenues come from energy sales, which allows it to finance its war against Ukraine. The main charterers of Sovcomflot's vessels are russia's largest oil and gas companies and traders. Sovcomflot is involved in servicing major oil and gas projects in russia: ‘’Sakhalin 1‘’, ‘’Sakhalin 2‘’, ‘’Varandey‘’, ‘’Prirazlomnoye‘’, ‘’Novy Port‘’, ‘’Yamal LNG‘’ and others. Prior to russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the company's fleet consisted of about 145 vessels. After the imposition of sanctions, Sovcomflot transferred dozens of vessels to the ownership of companies it had set up, including in foreign jurisdictions, in order to circumvent them, and began the practice of constantly ‘juggling’ (transferring) vessels to related companies. The tankers ‘re-registered’ by Sovcomflot to related companies, according to expert estimates, are part of the so-called ‘shadow tanker fleet’ of the russian federation to continue selling russian oil, oil products and liquefied gas under western sanctions. On 11 September 2024, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on 10 oil tankers (including the ‘Zaliv Aniva’) related to the transportation of oil or oil products from russia to third countries.