Sea vessels

The vessel is involved in stealing Ukrainian grain and exporting it to Turkey, makes calls at the ports of the TOT of Ukraine, violating the state borders of Ukraine. In April 2022, USA imposed sanctions on five vessels, including the "SV Nikolay", affiliated with Alfa-Leasing LLC, a sanctioned subsidiary of Alfa-Bank JSC, as part of the restrictions on Alfa-Bank JSC, the largest private financial institution in russia, which provides financial services to the russian military-industrial complex. Since 16.12.2022 the vessel has been owned and managed by the russian transport company Riversi Plyus LLC.

Involved in the export of russian coal for export. In order to conceal the country of origin, the coal of the russian JSC "Sibirskii Antratsyt" was reloaded in the Baltic Sea from the vessel "Pola Dudinka" to the large bulk carrier "Syros Island" (IMO 9720299), which is operated by Greek companies. After the operation was completed, the vessel "Syros Island" headed towards the port of Said (Egypt), while the "Pola Dudinka" returned to the port of Ust-Luga (russia) on 21.10.2022. On February 24, 2023, USA imposed sanctions on the russian company Pola Rise LLC and 22 affiliated vessels, including the Pola Dudinka, for activities in the maritime sector of the russian economy, participation in increasing russia's trade with Turkey, and facilitating the supply of materials to construction sites in the Arctic.

It is involved in the export of Ukrainian grain and metal products from the temporarily occupied Mariupol to the russian port of Rostov-na-Donu, as well as in the import of reinforced concrete structures and building materials to Mariupol (to equip fortifications and fortifications). The vessel has been repeatedly recorded by the Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Institute for Strategic Studies and the BlackSeaNews editorial board as having called at the ports of the TOT of Crimea in violation of Ukrainian legislation and international sanctions. The vessel is also involved in deliveries of ilmenite to the port of Feodosia. The vessel belongs to the sanctioned russian company Reka-More Managing Company LLC (TIN 6164275559, IMO 5285932), whose founder and CEO is Arustamov Gennadii Arturovich (TIN 616113680135, is under Ukrainian sanctions). Among the customers of the services provided by Reka-More Managing Company LLC are the Ministry of Defense and the security agencies of the russian federation, as well as sanctioned russian companies such as PJSC Shipyard Vympel (TIN 7610015674).

It is involved in the russian LNG tanker fleet, expanding russia's export capabilities in the LNG trade, and transshipment of LNG of russian origin (from the Yamal LNG project of the sanctioned PJSC Novatek) through European ports. On 23 August 2024, USA imposed sanctions on an LNG tanker.

The vessel is a violator of the 'Crimean sanctions' and is involved in the interests of the russian ministry of defence in supplying oil products to the Syrian group of russian troops. It was first recorded by the BlackSeaNews Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Strategic Studies as a violator of the Crimean sanctions on 12.05.2017, when it delivered 6.5 thousand tonnes of diesel fuel from Novorossiysk to the Feodosia oil depot (at that time, the Kerch Bridge did not exist, and fuel was delivered to the temporarily occupied Crimea by sea). In total, at least 21 such flights were recorded before the Kerch Bridge was put into operation (May 2018). The vast majority of voyages to the temporarily occupied Feodosia were carried out with the AIS signal switched off, while the vessel officially reported that the port of destination was the port of Kavkaz (russia). It regularly transported petrol and diesel fuel from the Feodosia oil depot to the Syrian port of Tartus to supply the russian troops in Syria, including the "Syrian squadron" of the russian Navy. It usually switched off its AIS in the Mediterranean Sea on the approach to Cyprus, then proceeded to Tartus with the AIS signal switched off, and was repeatedly photographed from space in the port of Tartus at the russian Navy naval base. 04.08.2023 The Sig was damaged after an attack in the Black Sea south of the Kerch Strait. The involvement of the Sig, which belongs to the fleet of the sanctioned russian shipping company Transpethrochart LLC, in the supply of fuel to russian troops in Syria came after the imposition of sanctions on Sovfracht JSC, one of the largest independent freight forwarding companies in russia, which acts as a key node in the military transport network of russian cargo vessels delivering North Korean weapons to military facilities, which are then transported to weapons depots on russia's western border for use in the war against Ukraine. In September 2019, USA imposed sanctions on the "Sig" tanker for providing material support to the sanctioned Sovfracht JSC. Despite the sanctions, the vessel has been freely navigating the Bosphorus Strait.

The vessel is involved in the military logistics network of the russian federation in the interests of the ministry of defense of the russian federation on the territory of Syria, in particular, for the movement of fuel and lubricants (aviation fuel) from/to the point of logistical support of the Navy of the Armed Forces of the russian federation at the ports "Tartus" and "Banyas" (Syria) ) and the port "Kavkaz" (russian federation) with the AIS signal turned off. The involvement of "Yaz", which belongs to the fleet of the russian sanctioned shipping company Transpetrochart LLC, in the supply of aviation fuel for the russian troops in Syria took place after the application of sanctions in September 2016 to JSC "Sovfracht" - one of the largest independent transport and forwarding companies of russia. which acts as a key node in the military transport network of russian cargo vessels that deliver North Korean weapons to military facilities, which are then transported to weapons depots on russia's western border for use in the war against Ukraine. The vessel has been making calls to the ports of TOT Crimea (Ukraine) since 2017, involved in the transportation of petroleum products from the port of Feodosia (TOT Crimea, Ukraine) to Syria (Tartus port) in February 2024, in December 2023 with AIS turned off. In September 2019, USA imposed sanctions on the vessel "Yaz".

It is involved in the export of Ukrainian grain from the ports of Sevastopol and Feodosia (TOT Crimea, Ukraine), in particular to Lebanon (addressed to Syrian companies), including transshipment in the russian port of Kavkaz, with the AIS signal switched off, following the traditional scheme of concealing calls to Ukrainian ports in the TOT of Ukraine. The russian companies TD Fregat LLC (TIN 7704388784), Agro-Fregat LLC (TIN 6141055691), Agromera LLC ( TIN 9001021176), Syrian companies Nabd Food LLC, Basel Amer Trading Est are involved in the export of Ukrainian grain to Syria. The vessel is also involved in deliveries of ilmenite to the port of Feodosia, which was previously delivered by the bulk carrier Nour Star to the port of Caucasus from Vietnam. In addition, in April 2023, the vessel made two voyages from Taganrog to the Turkish port of Tasuku to transport cargo for the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, which Rosatom is building in Turkey.

The tanker is involved in the export of russian oil/oil products to third countries from russian ports, in particular in the Baltic Sea. The owner, manager and commercial manager of the tanker since January 2024 is Seasphere Dynamics FZE (UAE), whose fleet consists only of the 'TARANG' vessel, and the ISM manager is Akkrum Ship Management (India). The tanker is certified by the Indian regulator Indian Register of Shipping (IACS). The tanker 'TARANG' is affiliated with the Indian company Gatik Ship Management, one of the leading operators of the so-called 'shadow fleet', which has become the largest carrier of russian oil under sanctions since the beginning of the full-scale war against Ukraine. Tankers operated/managed by India's Gatik Ship Management continue to be used by related companies and call at russian ports. As sanctions are being imposed, russia uses a scheme of "juggling" ships between related companies to conceal oil exports outside the price cap and other restrictions, as well as to hide the real owners of ships, and to ensure unimpeded transportation of fossil fuels by a 'shadow' fleet of obsolete oil tankers, creates new companies for these purposes (in the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Turkey, Mauritius, Seychelles, and other jurisdictions) with non-transparent organizational and ownership structures. In order to implement this scheme, technical/commercial management and ship owners are constantly changing, and vessels are renamed with a change of flag, MMSI, call-sign, including for sanctioned vessels. Shadow fleet vessels operate under “convenient flags”, which allows them to conceal their true origin and avoid control by international organizations and insurance companies. Almost all vessels that are involved in the transportation of russian oil by the shadow fleet since 2022 have been certified by the Indian regulator Indian Register of Shipping (IACS). The certification of shadow fleet vessels allows the shipowner/operator to insure the vessels, which, in turn, allows the vessels to enter ports and pass through various specific sea routes (straits, canals, etc.). The 'shadow' fleet, transporting huge volumes of crude oil through heavily trafficked routes through narrow straits close to the coastline, without proper P&I insurance, with automatic identification systems disabled, threatens an environmental disaster with significant economic costs to be borne by the affected coastal countries and/or the international community. The recent incidents off Malaysia only underscore the need for swift action to curb the potentially devastating impact of the growing 'shadow fleet'. 'Shadow' tankers have already been involved in 50 incidents from the Danish Straits all the way to Malaysia since russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to CREA, from January to August 2024, the number of shadow tankers crossing the Danish Straits in Europe increased by 277% compared to the same period in 2022, with 64% of the 46 million tons of russian marine oil transported through the Danish Straits being transported by shadow tankers. In the same period, the number of shadow tankers in the Straits of Dover and Gibraltar increased by 355% compared to 2022, transporting 67% of the 37 million tons of oil through the straits. The Suez Canal experienced a staggering 649% increase in shadow tanker traffic, with 69% of the 52 million tons of russian crude oil passing through it being transported by these vessels. Thus, the 'shadow fleet' of the russian federation continues to provide multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin bypassing sanctions, disguising its activities under the flags of third countries, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant threats to environmental safety with significant economic costs for coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequate insurance of shadow fleet tankers.

The vessel was involved in the export of Ukrainian grain and metal with the AIS signal turned off, following the traditional scheme of concealing calls to Ukrainian ports in the TOT of Ukraine. In May 2023, the vessel changed its name, flag, and management, after which it refocused on illegal voyages to the ports of the TOT of Crimea. The vessel under the former name Salvinia was transporting ilmenite (the main raw material for titanium production) from Chornomorsk to the Romanian port of Constanta, from where the raw materials were picked up by the sanctioned Syrian vessel Souria (new name - San Damian, IMO 9274331) and delivered to the temporarily occupied Feodosia. Since June 2023, the vessel has made at least five illegal calls to the closed ports of Sevastopol and Feodosia, delivering cargo from the TOT of Crimea to the Turkish port of Bartin and for transshipment to the port of Kavkaz in the Kerch Strait. During one of the vessel's calls to the port of Sevastopol, another name "Cristal-2" was painted on the stern to conceal its real name. The russian companies Kuban-Forward LLC (TIN 2308103203), TD Fregat LLC (TIN 7704388784), and the Turkish company Mesci̇er Metal Mamülleri̇ Pazarlama Sanayi̇ Ve Ti̇caret Li̇mi̇ted Şi̇rketi̇, which has a metallurgical plant in Bartyn, are involved in the export of Ukrainian metal products and Ukrainian grain to Turkey. In February 2024, the Security Service of Ukraine served the ship's captain with a notice of suspicion of violating the procedure for entry/exit to/from the TOT of Ukraine. In 2024, the vessel continues to steal Ukrainian grain from the TOT of Ukraine, in particular from the port of Sevastopol, by manipulating the AIS signal.

Involved in the export of Ukrainian grain from the port of Sevastopol (TOT Crimea, Ukraine) to the Iranian port of Bandar Imam Khomeini, to Syria and Yemen with the AIS signal turned off, following the traditional scheme of concealing calls to Ukrainian ports in the TOT of Ukraine. The russian companies Aval LLC (TIN 7720314451, under Ukrainian sanctions), Pallada LLC (TIN 6161095847), and the Syrian state-owned company "The General Organization for trading, storage and processing of grain" were involved in the theft of Ukrainian grain by the vessel. Pallada LLC has repeatedly been involved in the theft of Ukrainian grain. In April 2024, Security Service of Ukraine served the ship's captain with a notice of suspicion of violating the procedure for entry/exit to/from the TOT of Ukraine. In 2024, the vessel continues to steal Ukrainian grain from the TOT of Ukraine.

During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price-cap policy on russian oil, the tanker is involved in the export of russian oil from russian ports to third countries, and resorts to the practice of turning off the AIS signal, conducting so-called 'dark activities' at sea. The vessel is certified by the Indian regulator Indian Register of Shipping (IACS). The tanker 'ACHILLES" is affiliated with the Indian company Gatik Ship Management, one of the leading operators of the so-called 'shadow' fleet involved in the transportation of russian crude oil under Western sanctions, and the company Gaurik Ship Management LLP, which is related to Gatik, which in 2023, together with Caishan Ship Management, Galena Ship Management, Plutos Ship Management, Geras Ship Management, Girik Ship Management, Orion Ship Management LLP, Nautilus Shipping (India), Ark Seakonnect Shipmanagment LLC, Zidan Ship Management, was involved in a scheme to 'juggle' vessels managed by Gatik Ship Management to avoid sanctions. Gatik Ship Management and Gaurik Ship Management LLP were the previous managers of the tanker 'ACHILLES'. Tankers operated/managed by India's Gatik Ship Management continue to be used by related companies and call at russian ports. As sanctions are being imposed, russia uses a scheme of "juggling" ships between related companies to conceal oil exports outside the price cap and other restrictions, as well as to hide the real owners of ships, and to ensure unimpeded transportation of fossil fuels by a 'shadow' fleet of obsolete oil tankers, creates new companies for these purposes (in the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Turkey, Mauritius, Seychelles, and other jurisdictions) with non-transparent organizational and ownership structures. In order to implement this scheme, technical/commercial management and ship owners are constantly changing, and vessels are renamed with a change of flag, MMSI, call-sign, including for sanctioned vessels. Shadow fleet vessels operate under “convenient flags”, which allows them to conceal their true origin and avoid control by international organizations and insurance companies. Almost all vessels that are involved in the transportation of russian oil by the shadow fleet since 2022 have been certified by the Indian regulator Indian Register of Shipping (IACS). The certification of shadow fleet vessels allows the shipowner/operator to insure the vessels, which, in turn, allows the vessels to enter ports and pass through various specific sea routes (straits, canals, etc.). The 'shadow' fleet, transporting huge volumes of crude oil through heavily trafficked routes through narrow straits close to the coastline, without proper P&I insurance, with automatic identification systems disabled, threatens an environmental disaster with significant economic costs to be borne by the affected coastal countries and/or the international community. The recent incidents off Malaysia only underscore the need for swift action to curb the potentially devastating impact of the growing 'shadow fleet'. 'Shadow' tankers have already been involved in 50 incidents from the Danish Straits all the way to Malaysia since russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to CREA, from January to August 2024, the number of shadow tankers crossing the Danish Straits in Europe increased by 277% compared to the same period in 2022, with 64% of the 46 million tons of russian marine oil transported through the Danish Straits being transported by shadow tankers. In the same period, the number of shadow tankers in the Straits of Dover and Gibraltar increased by 355% compared to 2022, transporting 67% of the 37 million tons of oil through the straits. The Suez Canal experienced a staggering 649% increase in shadow tanker traffic, with 69% of the 52 million tons of russian crude oil passing through it being transported by these vessels. Thus, the 'shadow fleet' of the russian federation continues to provide multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin bypassing sanctions, disguising its activities under the flags of third countries, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant threats to environmental safety with significant economic costs for coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequate insurance of shadow fleet tankers.

Involved in the export of Ukrainian grain from the port of Sevastopol (TOT Crimea, Ukraine) to the Iranian port of Bandar Imam Khomeini, to Syria and Yemen with the AIS signal turned off, following the traditional scheme of concealing calls to Ukrainian ports in the TOT of Ukraine. The russian companies Aval LLC (TIN 7720314451, under Ukrainian sanctions), Pallada LLC (TIN 6161095847), and the Syrian state-owned company "The General Organization for trading, storage and processing of grain" were involved in the theft of Ukrainian grain by the vessel. Pallada LLC has repeatedly been involved in the theft of Ukrainian grain. Despite the fact that the port of destination of the vessel was the Lebanese port of Beirut, the documents for the export of Ukrainian grain show that the wheat consignments were exported to Syria. In addition, in July 2024, the vessel received a UN permit to unload Ukrainian grain in the port of Salif (Yemen). Thus, the stolen grain was delivered from the temporarily occupied Sevastopol to Yemen for the first time.