Shadow Fleet

During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price cap policy on russian crude oil and petroleum products, the tanker has been involved since 2025 in the export of russian Urals crude oil from the port of Primorsk in the interests of PJSC Surgutneftegaz, russian petroleum products from the port of Ust-Luga in the interests of PJSC Oil Company Rosneft.
On February 12, 2026, Ukraine imposed sanctions on the vessel.

During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price cap policy on russian crude oil and petroleum products, the tanker has been involved in 2025 in the export of russian ESPO crude oil from russian ports in the Pacific region to the PRC.
On February 12, 2026, Ukraine imposed sanctions on the vessel.

During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price cap policy on russian crude oil and petroleum products, the tanker was involved in 2025 in the export of russian crude oil and petroleum products from russian ports in the Pacific region to the People’s Republic of China.
On February 12, 2026, Ukraine imposed sanctions on the vessel.

The tanker is involved in the transportation of Iranian and russian crude oil and petroleum products.
On April 16, 2025, the US imposed sanctions on the tanker for transporting Iranian oil to the Chinese oil refinery Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co.
On February 12, 2026, Ukraine imposed sanctions on the vessel.

The tanker has been involved in the transport of Iranian oil and, since russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has begun, it has been used to transport russian crude oil and petroleum products.
The tanker is affiliated with the sanctioned company Al-Qatirji, which used its fleet, including the tanker IMO 9198094, to transport Iranian oil, in particular to China and Syria, on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force and the Houthis. The Panamanian company Bluespectrum Shipping SA is the registered owner and commercial manager of the vessel. On November 14, 2024, the United States imposed sanctions on the owner and commercial manager of the tanker—Bluespectrum Shipping SA—for providing material assistance, sponsorship, or financial, material, or technological support, as well as goods or services to Al-Qatirji or in support of it.
On November 14, 2024, the United States imposed sanctions on the tanker as property in which the sanctioned company Bluespectrum Shipping SA has an interest.
On February 12, 2026, Ukraine imposed sanctions on the vessel.

The tanker is involved in the transportation of Iranian Pars crude oil through STS transfers with a vessel of the sanctioned National Iranian Tanker Company, a subsidiary of the National Iranian Petroleum Company, which is managed by the Iranian Ministry of Petroleum. Sanctioned Iranian tankers rely on ship-to-ship transfers outside of jurisdictional port limits with non-sanctioned vessels to transport petroleum to foreign customers, obfuscating the oil’s Iranian origin.
The tanker transported numerous shipments of Iranian oil to China.
On February 24, 2025, USA imposed sanctions on the tanker.
On February 12, 2026, Ukraine imposed sanctions on the vessel.

The vessel is involved in the transportation of Iranian oil using deceptive practices, including manipulation of AIS to conceal attempts to transport Iranian crude oil. The tanker is also involved in the export of russian crude oil/oil products from russian ports in the Baltic and Black Seas during the period of the G7+ oil embargo and the price cap policy on russian crude oil/oil products.
On March 13, 2025, USA imposed sanctions on Sun Science International Co. Limited, the owner, operator and manager of the tanker, in connection with its activities in the oil sector of the Iranian economy.
On March 13, 2025, USA imposed sanctions on the tanker as a property in which Sun Science International Co. Limited has an interest.
On February 12, 2026, Ukraine imposed sanctions on the vessel.

During the period of the G7+ oil embargo and the price cap policy on russian crude oil/petroleum products, the tanker is involved in the export of russian crude oil/petroleum products from russian ports in the Baltic and Black Seas, and in high-risk, deceptive practices, in particular, in the Kerch Strait area in the Black Sea (disabling AIS, making STS transmissions).
In December 2024 and January 2025, the tanker called at the port of Komysh-Burun in the TOT of Crimea.
In January 2025, STS transmissions were made in the Kerch Strait area in the Black Sea with the sanctioned tanker IMO 9252400 (on October 17, 2024, USA imposed sanctions on the vessel for illegal supplies of Iranian oil), with the tanker IMO 9224441 (affiliated through related companies with the sanctioned PJSC Sovcomflot, the largest state-owned shipping company in russia for servicing and supporting offshore hydrocarbon production, transportation of russian crude oil, petroleum products, liquefied natural gas), which is involved in high-risk, deceptive practices in the Kerch Strait area and in December 2024 was supposed to receive fuel oil from the Volgoneft-212 tanker that sank in the Kerch Strait due to damage caused by a storm, which led to an environmental disaster, including in the temporarily occupied Crimea, due to a fuel oil spill. STS transmissions with the tanker IMO 9224441 in the Kerch Strait area also took place in December 2024.
The tanker is linked to sanctioned companies Fractal Marine DMCC (UAE), Wanta Shipping LLC-FZ (UAE), which managed the vessel in 2023-2024.
Fractal Marine DMCC (UAE) is considered one of the leading operators of the shadow fleet, which in early 2023 was among the three largest carriers of russian crude oil, together with Radiating World Shipping Services LLC (UAE) and Gatik Ship Management (India), and played a significant role in the export of the russian crude oil to countries around the world during the period of sanctions restrictions. Fractal Marine DMCC managed a fleet of 28 tankers as an intermediary between shipowners and charterers.
Fractal Marine DMCC (UAE), Wanta Shipping LLC-FZ (UAE) are part of a shipping empire controlled by the sanctioned Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, son of Ali Shamkhani, the chief political advisor to Iran's supreme leader. Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani uses his father's political influence to corrupt top-level officials in the Iranian regime in order to build and operate a huge fleet of tankers and container ships. This fleet transports crude oil and petroleum products from Iran and russia, as well as other cargoes, to buyers around the world, generating tens of billions of dollars in profits. Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani's shipping empire consists of a vast fleet of vessels, ship management companies, and front companies that launder billions of dollars in profits from the global sale of Iranian and russian crude oil and petroleum products, mostly to buyers in the PRC. The shipping empire takes significant measures to conceal its operations and obscure its ties to the Shamkhani family, Iran, and russia.
Fractal Marine DMCC has played an important role in the management and operation of the tanker and container ship fleet of Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani's shipping network. Wanta Shipping LLC-FZ (UAE) provides operational services for Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani's shipping network fleet.
Wanta Shipping LLC-FZ provided technical management of the vessel IMO 9308065, which was involved in an incident in the Baltic Sea due to technical malfunctions. On January 10, 2025, the vessel IMO 9308065, loaded with russian oil (99 thousand tons) in the port of Ust-Luga, lost control in the Baltic Sea. According to the German Havariekommando, the vessel's power supply system and engine failed, it lost its ability to maneuver and began to drift at low speed in the open sea near the island of Rügen. This incident once again demonstrates the growing threat of oil spills by outdated shadow fleet vessels.
The tanker is also linked to the management in 2025 by Tarabya Logistics Ltd (UAE), which in July and August 2025 was sanctioned by the EU and Switzerland, respectively, for managing vessels that engaged in illicit and high-risk shipping practices (sailing with gaps in automatic identification systems and high-risk ship-to-ship transshipments) while transporting oil of russian origin or exported from russia.
After sanctions were imposed on Tarabya Logistics Ltd, another change in the ship's management took place.

During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price cap policy on russian crude oil and petroleum products, the tanker has been involved in the export of russian crude oil and petroleum products from russian ports in the Baltic Sea, employing deceptive and high-risk shipping practices, including disabling AIS in the Gulf of Finland.
On February 12, 2026, Ukraine imposed sanctions on the vessel.

The tanker is involved in transporting Iranian crude oil, exporting russian crude oil from russian ports in the Baltic Sea and the Pacific region to third countries, and engaging in deceptive, high-risk shipping practices (AIS manipulation/spoofing).
The international non-governmental organization Greenpeace classifies the tanker as part of a shadow fleet of tankers that transport russian oil around the world via the Baltic Sea and the Kadetsky Channel area in the Bay of Mecklenburg, posing a threat to the surrounding environment.
The tanker resorted to manipulating its AIS signal while loading crude oil from Sirri Island (Iran) in August 2021, as well as falsifying its MMSI, posing as another vessel, while unloading Iranian oil in Banyas (Syria) in September 2021. In particular, during the unloading of Iranian oil in Banyas (Syria) in September 2021, according to AIS data, the vessel was anchored west of the Cypriot STS transfer zone, while simultaneously sending AIS messages from Spain.
Since russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, more than 100 vessels that previously helped Iran export oil are now helping russia transport russian crude oil and petroleum products.
Many tankers involved in transporting Iranian oil to countries such as China are also involved in Venezuelan trade, including tanker IMO 9183271. On June 11, 2022, Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi signed a 20-year cooperation agreement to expand ties in the oil and petrochemical industries, as well as in the military and economic spheres. Since then, bilateral ties have begun to develop. Most cargo is transported by ships belonging to the sanctioned National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) in both directions. A significant number of ships flying under foreign (non-Iranian) flags are also involved in this trade.
On February 12, 2026, Ukraine imposed sanctions on the vessel.

During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price cap policy on russian crude oil and petroleum products, the tanker has been involved in the export of russian crude oil and petroleum products from russian ports in the Baltic Sea, including through deceptive and high-risk shipping practices such as disabling AIS, particularly in the area of the russian port of Ust-Luga.
On February 12, 2026, Ukraine imposed sanctions on the vessel.

The tanker has been implicated in the export of russian crude oil to third countries from ports in the Black Sea and Baltic Sea, including while operating with its Automatic Identification System (AIS) disabled. It was previously involved in the transportation of Venezuelan oil before switching to the carriage of designated russian-origin crude oil.
The international NGO Greenpeace has identified the tanker as part of the shadow fleet transporting russian oil globally via the Baltic Sea, including through the Cadet Canal area in the Bay of Mecklenburg, posing risks to the environment.
The tanker sails under the flag of Cameroon, which is included in the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MOU) blacklist of flags, compiled on the basis of vessel inspection results for technical condition.
According to the analytical centre Lloyd’s List, the tanker is an example of high-risk, dark, and deceptive practices linked to fraudulent actions by technical management companies, which resulted in the allocation of unique International Maritime Organization (IMO) numbers to them. In response, the IMO Legal Committee established an intersessional working group to define the levels of due diligence required for the use of the unique identification number scheme for company owners and IMO-registered shipowners.
On October 15, 2025, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on the vessel.
On February 12, 2026, Ukraine imposed sanctions on the vessel.