Marine and Aircraft
Vessels
Airports and Ports
involved in the transportation of weapons, stolen Ukrainian products and in the circumvention of sanctions
Total number:
1067
Marine vessels
155
Captains
Updated: 18.08.2025
Maritime logistics is critically important for building up the aggressor`s military capabilities, moving troops, obtaining weapons and sanctioned goods, and trading stolen goods. Aggressors transport weapons through international straits on civilian merchant vessels. Exporting fossil fuels to circumvent sanctions is the main source of income for russia and Iran. The shadow tanker fleet and ships without ice class in the Arctic threaten an environmental disaster. Through the sale of agricultural products from the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories, russia finances the war and maintains the loyalty of its allies, Iran and the DPRK.
Together we can stop this to restore peace and security
Actions to be taken:
  • to sanction the vessels on the list below, as well as all related companies and individuals (owners, operators, managers, executives, senior crew members)
  • to prohibit the entry of such vessels into ports, territorial waters, EEZs and international straits, and the sale of spare parts for them
 
  • to require bank statements to confirm compliance with the price-cap when receiving insurance and other services
  • to involve financial and specialized institutions in the gathering of evidence, to publish the results of investigations, and to apply real penalties, including significant fines
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Air vessels Ports Airports
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total: 1067
MIN HANG
Vessel name
MIN HANG
IMO
9257137
Flag (Current)
Cook Islands Cook Islands
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
icon arrow-tree Transporting russian crude oil/oil products in violation of other restrictions
In 2024, the tanker is involved in the export of russian crude oil to third countries from russian ports in the Baltic Sea and the Pacific region. In November 2022, United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) included the tanker in a public list of vessels suspected of involvement in the illegal transportation of Iranian oil. According to Lloyd's List, ІМО 9257137 is linked to anonymous Chinese buyers who spent about $376 million to purchase 13 tankers to carry out risky ship-to-ship transportation of russian oil in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Ship-to-shore logistics hubs are a common feature of the scheme, allowing for the concealment of ownership and origin of cargo. In addition to the mid-Atlantic STS hub, there are also areas near the ports of Kalamata (Greece), Malta, Ceuta, and the Caucasus where ship-to-ship operations have been established for russian oil. STS's operations in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean are outside the jurisdiction of port authorities, with limited technical and operational oversight, which increases safety and environmental concerns due to the unknown insurance and vessel ownership data. Lloyd's List has tracked five Aframax tankers, seven large oil carriers and one Suezmax vessel to an anonymous buyer through separate but related companies operating offshore Hong Kong and China that own similar vessels. The group of tankers was acquired between May and July 2022 for a total of $285 million, based on ship brokerage reports and market valuations. Since then, all but one of the tankers have been involved in the transshipment of russian oil cargoes at a high-risk transshipment hub located 860 nautical miles west of Portugal in international waters. The vessels purchased by the anonymous Chinese buyer are 15 years old or more, making it impossible for most major oil companies to charter them and impossible to obtain conventional financing. The shadow tanker fleet continues to provide multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin bypassing sanctions, disguising its activities under the flags of third countries, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant environmental threats with significant economic costs to coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequate insurance of shadow fleet tankers. On December 03, 2024, USA imposed sanctions on the tanker. On May 20, 2025, the EU imposed sanctions, which enter into force on May 21, 2025, on the tanker for the transportation of crude oil/petroleum products originating in or exported from russia, using irregular high-risk shipping practices as specified in the International Maritime Organization General Assembly Resolution A.1192(33). On June 03, 2025, the sanctions imposed by Switzerland on the vessel came into force. On July 21, 2025, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on the vessel.
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OLIA
Vessel name
OLIA
IMO
9268112
Flag (Current)
unknown
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
icon arrow-tree Transporting russian crude oil/oil products in violation of other restrictions
During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price-cap policy on russian oil, the tanker is involved in the export of russian oil from ports in the Baltic, Black seas, and the Pacific region, mainly to China. The tanker resorts to deceptive tactics at sea (changing identifiers or manipulating its location), conducting dark activities at sea with the AIS signal turned off near the russian port of Taman (russia), Iran, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Vietnam. The international NGO Greenpeace refers to the tanker as part of a shadowy fleet of tankers transporting russian oil around the world and threatening the environment. According to the data of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), which monitors Iran-related tanker traffic using satellite data, the vessel was involved in the transportation of Iranian oil and has switched to transporting russian oil since April 2022. Since the beginning of russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, more than 100 vessels that previously helped Tehran export Iranian export oil are now helping russia transport russian oil/oil products. The tanker is linked to an attempt to supply sanctioned Iranian oil to the EU (Croatia) in 2022, obtained through ship-to-ship transshipment near Malaysian waters. On January 10, 2025, USA imposed sanctions on the vessel. From July 20, 2025, the EU imposed sanctions on a tanker for transporting crude oil/petroleum products that originate in russia or are exported from russia using irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organization General Assembly resolution A.1192 (33). On August 12, 2025, Switzerland imposed sanctions on the vessel. Since September 12, 2025, the United Kingdom has imposed sanctions on the vessel.
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PANDA
Vessel name
PANDA
IMO
9284582
Flag (Current)
Guyana Guyana
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
icon arrow-tree Transporting russian crude oil/oil products in violation of other restrictions
Since August 2022, the tanker has been involved in the export of russian oil, engaged in dark activities in the Baltic Sea near the port of Ust-Luga (October 2024), near Oman (October 2022, May 2023), Indonesia (July, December 2022). According to the American human rights group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), which monitors Iranian-related tanker traffic using satellite data, the vessel was involved in the transportation of Iranian oil and has switched to transporting russian oil since 2022. Since the beginning of russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, more than 90 vessels that previously helped Tehran export Iranian export oil are now helping russia transport russian oil/oil products. In May 2022, UANI first predicted that russia would turn to a 'ghost armada' to ensure oil flows to its Chinese partner. The international public organization Greenpeace refers to the tanker as a shadow fleet of tankers transporting russian oil around the world and threatening the environment. On January 10, 2025, USA imposed sanctions on the vessel. On May 20, 2025, the EU imposed sanctions, which enter into force on May 21, 2025, on the tanker for the transportation of crude oil/petroleum products originating in or exported from russia, using irregular high-risk shipping practices as specified in the International Maritime Organization General Assembly Resolution A.1192(33). On June 03, 2025, the sanctions imposed by Switzerland on the vessel came into force. On July 21, 2025, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on the vessel.
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MEDNA
Vessel name
MEDNA
IMO
9281683
Flag (Current)
Comoro Islands Comoro Islands
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
icon arrow-tree Transporting russian crude oil/oil products in violation of other restrictions
According to the USA-based human rights group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), which monitors Iran-related tanker traffic using satellite data, the vessel was involved in the transportation of Iranian oil and has switched to transporting russian oil since October 2021. Since the beginning of russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, more than 90 vessels that previously helped Tehran export Iranian export oil are now helping russia transport russian oil/oil products. In May 2022, UANI first predicted that russia would turn to a 'ghost armada' to ensure oil flows to its Chinese partner. The vessel resorts to deceptive practices, including manipulation of the vessel's location and dark activities near Malaysia. On April 04, 2024, the USA imposed sanctions on the tanker ІМО 9281683, affiliated with OCEANLINK MARITIME DMCC and involved in cooperation with the sanctioned Iranian company Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company in the delivery of Iranian goods. Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company controls a network of front companies in Iran and other jurisdictions through which Iranian goods are sold in favor of the Ministry of Defense and Logistics of the Armed Forces of Iran (MODAFL) and the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS). On December 16, 2024, the EU imposed sanctions on the tanker (effective from December 17, 2024) due to the transportation of crude oil or petroleum products originating in or exported from russia, using irregular high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organization General Assembly Resolution A.1192(33). On December 23, 2024, Switzerland imposed sanctions on the vessel in connection with the transportation of crude oil or petroleum products originating in or exported from russia, using irregular and risky shipping practices, as set out in the resolution of the General Assembly of the International Maritime Organization A.1192(33). In June 2025, Canada imposed sanctions on the vessel.
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BERTHA
Vessel name
BERTHA
IMO
9292163
Flag (Current)
Cook Islands Cook Islands
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
icon arrow-tree Transportation of Iranian crude oil/petroleum products
The tanker is involved in the transportation of sanctioned Iranian oil, conducting dark activities at sea, in particular, for the STS oil transfer in the northeastern Atlantic Ocean with the participation of EMILY S (IMO 9321847), Merope (IMO 9281891), Skadi (IMO 9230971). According to the American human rights group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), which monitors tanker traffic related to Iran using satellite data, the vessel is involved in the transportation of Iranian crude oil and/or oil products, and since May 2023 has been included in the 'Armada of Ghosts' list maintained by UANI. The tanker BERTHA has also been included by UANI in the list of Maduro-Khamenei Oil Alliance tankers involved in the transportation of Iranian and Venezuelan oil since 2019. On June 11, 2022, Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro and former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi signed a 20-year cooperation agreement to expand ties in the oil and petrochemical industries, military and economic spheres. Since then, bilateral ties have been developing: in 2023, Iran supplied more than 12 million barrels of crude oil and gas condensate, and Venezuela supplied about the same amount of fuel oil to Iran in return. Most of the cargo is transported by vessels of the sanctioned National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) in both directions: Iranian oil and gas are unloaded in Venezuelan ports, and the same NITC tankers load Venezuelan fuel oil on the way back to China. However, a significant number of non-NITC vessels flying a foreign (non-Iranian) flag are also involved in the trade. The vessel is affiliated with the Chinese company Shanghai Legendary Ship Management Company Limited (under USA sanctions), whose fleet has been involved in the illegal transportation of millions of barrels of Iranian oil since at least 2022. On December 03, 2024, USA imposed sanctions on the vessel.
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BILI
Vessel name
BILI
IMO
9285756
Flag (Current)
Gambia Gambia
Vessel Type
Chemical/Oil Products Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
icon arrow-tree Transportation of Iranian crude oil/petroleum products
The tanker is involved in the transportation of sanctioned Iranian oil, deceptive practices with the disabling of AIS signals, and dark activities near Iran. Iran relies on an extensive network of tankers and ship management companies in multiple jurisdictions to transport its oil to foreign customers, using deceptive tactics such as falsifying documentation, manipulating ship tracking systems, and constantly changing ship names and flags. One of the most commonly used tactics to evade oil sanctions is 'flag hopping' in various national registries, which allows the vessel to carry out transportation and have the right to moor. This tactic is often accompanied by the creation of fictitious companies, change of owners, managers, ship names, and change of physical markings of the vessel. Some shipowners deliberately use flag registries to evade sanctions, many of which do not have the resources and capabilities to track and verify the history of their vessels. The tanker is affiliated with the Indian company Tightship Shipping Management (OPC) Private Limited, whose fleet (including the tanker ІМО 9285756) is involved in the transportation of Iranian oil worth tens of millions of dollars for the sanctioned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) at least since 2022. The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is one of the largest oil and gas companies in the world and is controlled by the Iranian Ministry of Oil. NIOC and its subsidiaries explore, produce, transport, refine and export oil and natural gas in Iran. The oil deals of NIOC, including its subsidiaries, are used to generate revenue for the IRGC-QF (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and Hizballah. On December 03, 2024, USA imposed sanctions on the vessel.
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CERES I
Vessel name
CERES I
IMO
9229439
Flag (Current)
Sao Tome and Principe Sao Tome and Principe
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
icon arrow-tree Transportation of Iranian crude oil/petroleum products
The tanker has been involved in the transportation of Iranian oil since at least 2021, STS transfers of Iranian oil. In particular, in January 2024, near Singapore, CERES I transferred almost 300,000 metric tons of Iranian oil from ship to ship in the interests of the sanctioned Jazira Das International Products Trading LLC (UAE), China Concord Petroleum Company (CCPC) and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is one of the largest oil and gas companies in the world and is controlled by the Iranian Ministry of Oil. NIOC and its subsidiaries explore, produce, transport, process and export oil and natural gas in Iran. NIOC's oil deals, including those of its subsidiaries, are used to generate revenue for the IRGC-QF (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and Hizballah. Jazira Das International Products Trading LLC is a UAE-registered company involved in falsifying documents to 'disguise' barrels of Iranian oil from the sanctioned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) as Emirati oil, coordinating many NIOC oil shipments to the sanctioned China Concord Petroleum Company to transport millions of barrels of oil, and concealing NIOC's involvement in the supply. According to the American human rights group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), which monitors Iran-related tanker traffic using satellite data, the vessel is involved in the transportation of Iranian crude oil and/or petroleum products and has been included in the UANI's 'Ghost Armada' list since April 2021. Also, the tanker CERES I was included by UANI in the list of tankers of the Maduro-Khamenei Oil Alliance involved in the transportation of Iranian and Venezuelan oil. On June 11, 2022, Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro and former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi signed a 20-year cooperation agreement to expand ties in the oil and petrochemical industries, military and economic spheres. Since then, bilateral ties have been developing: in 2023, Iran supplied more than 12 million barrels of crude oil and gas condensate, and Venezuela supplied about the same amount of fuel oil to Iran in return. Most of the cargo is transported by vessels of the sanctioned National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) in both directions: Iranian oil and gas are unloaded in Venezuelan ports, and the same NITC tankers load Venezuelan fuel oil on the way back to China. A significant number of non-NITC vessels flying foreign (non-Iranian) flags are also involved in the trade. Also, according to UANI, the CERES I tanker is one of 16 oil tankers that have switched from Iranian oil to russian oil as of July 2022. In July 2024, the CERES I tanker was involved in a collision with another oil tanker, causing an oil spill in international waters near Malaysia. During the collision, the CERES I's tracking signals did not correspond to its position, which prevented it from communicating with the other vessel. On December 03, 2024, USA imposed sanctions on the vessel.
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FIONA II
Vessel name
FIONA II
IMO
9262766
Flag (Current)
Panama Panama
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
icon arrow-tree Transportation of Iranian crude oil/petroleum products
The tanker is involved in the transportation of sanctioned Iranian oil, has been involved in the transportation of illegal Iranian oil since at least 2023, and has been engaged in deceptive practices and dark activities near Iran and Malaysia. In July 2024, the FIONA II transported almost 2 million barrels of Iranian crude oil to China on behalf of the sanctioned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is one of the largest oil and gas companies in the world and is controlled by the Iranian Ministry of Oil. NIOC and its subsidiaries explore, produce, transport, process and export oil and natural gas in Iran. NIOC's oil deals, including those of its subsidiaries, are used to generate revenue for the IRGC-QF (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and Hizballah. Iran relies on an extensive network of tankers and ship management companies in many jurisdictions to transport its oil to foreign customers, using deceptive tactics (falsification of documentation, manipulation of ship tracking systems, and constant changes of ship names and flags). One of the most commonly used tactics to evade oil sanctions is 'flag hopping' in various national registries, which allows the vessel to carry out transportation and have the right to moor. This tactic is often accompanied by the creation of fictitious companies, change of owners, managers, ship names, and change of physical markings of the vessel. Some shipowners deliberately use flag registries to evade sanctions, many of which do not have the resources and capabilities to track and verify the history of ships. On December 03, 2024, the United States imposed sanctions on the vessel.
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FT ISLAND
Vessel name
FT ISLAND
IMO
9166675
Flag (Current)
Honduras Honduras
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
icon arrow-tree Transportation of Iranian crude oil/petroleum products
The tanker has been implicated in the transportation of sanctioned Iranian oil, in particular to China, in the use of deceptive shipping practices, and in conducting dark activities near Malaysia. The vessel transported more than 1.6 million barrels of Iranian condensate to buyers in China on behalf of the sanctioned China Concord Petroleum Company and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) in April 2024. The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is one of the largest oil and gas companies in the world and is controlled by the Iranian Ministry of Oil. NIOC and its subsidiaries are engaged in the exploration, production, transportation, refining, and export of oil and natural gas in Iran. NIOC’s oil deals, including those of its subsidiaries, are used to generate revenue for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and Hizballah. On February 15, 2022, United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) identified two crude oil tankers transporting Iranian crude oil via ship-to-ship (STS) transfer, with the Automatic Identification System (AIS) turned off, in the waters east of Singapore: LATIN VENTURE (formerly known as PACIFIC BRAVO, IMO 9206035) and FT ISLAND (formerly known as CCPC VANGUARD, IMO 9166675). On February 17, 2022, the vessel reappeared east of the STS relocation site. On December 3, 2024, the United States imposed sanctions on the vessel.
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