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Marine Vessels

involved in the transportation of weapons, stolen
Ukrainian products and in the circumvention of sanctions

Total number:

1488

Marine vessels

545

Masters

Updated: 10.10.2026

Maritime logistics is critically important for building up the aggressor`s military capabilities, moving troops, obtaining weapons and sanctioned goods, and trading stolen goods. Aggressors transport weapons through international straits on civilian merchant vessels. Exporting fossil fuels to circumvent sanctions is the main source of income for russia and Iran. The shadow tanker fleet and ships without ice class in the Arctic threaten an environmental disaster. Through the sale of agricultural products from the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories, russia finances the war and maintains the loyalty of its allies, Iran and the DPRK.

Together we can stop this to restore peace and security

Actions to be taken

to sanction the vessels on the list below, as well as all related companies and individuals (owners, operators, managers, executives, senior crew members)
to prohibit the entry of such vessels into ports, territorial waters, EEZs and international straits, and the sale of spare parts for them
to apply secondary sanctions against companies and persons cooperating with such vessels and companies
to prohibit ship-to-ship operations with russian fossil fuels in the territorial waters and EEZs
to use technological solutions to detect the real routes of vessels that use spoofing and manipulate AIS
to require confirmation of P&I insurance coverage (capitalized and with an independent credit rating) for all oil tankers, which enter ports, territorial waters, EEZs and international straits, and to block passage for violators

to increase and ensure compliance with environmental and safety requirements for tankers entering territorial waters, EEZs and international straits
to require bank statements to confirm compliance with the price-cap when receiving insurance and other services
to involve financial and specialized institutions in the gathering of evidence, to publish the results of investigations, and to apply real penalties, including significant fines
to prohibit the sale of used tankers to the ‘owner states’ of the shadow fleet, to apply secondary sanctions to those who violate the ban
to stop the registration of vessels that systematically engage in dark activities at sea
to exchange information and synchronize efforts with other countries

Marine vessels

Shadow Fleet Masters

Total: 1

IRKUTSK

russian federation

General cargo ship

Cargo transportation from/to ТОТ of Ukraine

Theft of Ukrainian grain

The vessel is involved in the transportation of Ukrainian grain, coal and metal from the TOT of Ukraine with the AIS signal turned off, using the traditional scheme of concealing calls to Ukrainian ports in the TOT of Ukraine.
In May 2023, the vessel changed its name, flag, and management, after which it refocused on illegal voyages to the ports of the TOT of Crimea. The vessel under the former name Salvinia was transporting ilmenite (the main raw material for titanium production) from Chornomorsk to the Romanian port of Constanta, from where the raw materials were picked up by the sanctioned Syrian vessel Souria (new name - San Damian, IMO 9274331) and delivered to the temporarily occupied Feodosia.
Since June 2023, the vessel has made at least five illegal calls to the closed ports of Sevastopol and Feodosia, delivering cargo from the TOT of Crimea to the Turkish port of Bartin and for transshipment to the port of Kavkaz in the Kerch Strait.
During one of the vessel's calls to the port of Sevastopol, another name "Cristal-2" was painted on the stern to conceal its real name.
The russian companies Kuban-Forward LLC (TIN 2308103203), TD Fregat LLC (TIN 7704388784), and the Turkish company Mesci̇er Metal Mamülleri̇ Pazarlama Sanayi̇ Ve Ti̇caret Li̇mi̇ted Şi̇rketi̇, which has a metallurgical plant in Bartyn, are involved in the export of Ukrainian metal products and Ukrainian grain to Turkey.
In February 2024, the Security Service of Ukraine served the ship's captain with a notice of suspicion of violating the procedure for entry/exit to/from the TOT of Ukraine.
In 2024, the vessel continued to steal Ukrainian grain from the TOT of Ukraine, in particular from the temporarily occupied ports of Sevastopol and Berdiansk, by manipulating the AIS signal.
During 2024-2025, the vessel shipped, in particular, to Egypt, about 40,000 tons of Ukrainian coking coal from the temporarily occupied Ukrainian port of Mariupol using the following scheme: officially calls at the russian port of Temryuk; turns off the automatic identification system (AIS); sails to the port of Mariupol for loading; returns to Temryuk with the cargo; turns on the AIS; sails to the port of destination.
The vessel is operated by the russian company Krechet LLC (TIN 6167197524, Rostov region), the former CEO of which is Oleksandr Soldatov (TIN 614104187473), the current director (since July 27, 2023) of the occupation Mariupol Seaport Administration (TIN 9310000303). Krechet LLC manages three other vessels (IMO 9045601, IMO 1041348, IMO 9454125) involved in the transportation of Ukrainian coal from the temporarily occupied Mariupol.
On November 25, 2025, Ukraine imposed sanctions on the vessel.
Since July 24, 2026, the EU has imposed sanctions on the vessel.