Marine and Aircraft
Vessels
Airports and Ports
involved in the transportation of weapons, stolen Ukrainian products and in the circumvention of sanctions
Total number:
469
Sea vessels
Updated: 18.11.2024
Maritime logistics is critical for building up the aggressor`s military capabilities, moving troops, obtaining weapons and sanctioned items, and trafficking in stolen goods. Aggressors transport weapons through international straits on civilian merchant ships. Fossil fuel exports, bypassing sanctions, are the main source of income for russia and Iran. The shadow tanker fleet and ships without ice class in the Arctic threaten an environmental disaster. Through the sale of agricultural products from the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories, russia finances the war and maintains the loyalty of its allies - Syria, Iran, and the DPRK.
Together we can stop this to restore peace and security
Actions to be taken:
  • to sanction the vessels on the list below, as well as all related companies and individuals (owners, operators, managers, executives, senior crew members)
  • to prohibit the entry of such vessels into ports, territorial waters, EEZs and international straits, and the sale of spare parts for them
 
  • to require bank statements to confirm compliance with the price-cap when receiving insurance and other services
  • to involve financial and specialized institutions in the gathering of evidence, to publish the results of investigations, and to apply real penalties, including significant fines
 
 
 
 
 
AMBER 6
Vessel name
AMBER 6
IMO
9235713
Flag (Current)
Panama
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
 Transporting oil in violation of other restrictions
In 2024, the tanker will be involved in the export of russian oil to China from the port of Kozmino. The vessel is certified by the Korean Register (IACS). According to Lloyd's List, 'AMBER 6' is linked to anonymous Chinese buyers who spent about $376 million to purchase 13 tankers to carry out risky ship-to-ship transportation of russian oil in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Ship-to-shore logistics hubs are a common feature of the scheme, allowing for the concealment of ownership and origin of cargo. In addition to the mid-Atlantic STS hub, there are also areas near the ports of Kalamata (Greece), Malta, Ceuta, and the Caucasus where ship-to-ship operations have been established for russian oil. STS's operations in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean are outside the jurisdiction of port authorities, with limited technical and operational oversight, which increases safety and environmental concerns due to the unknown insurance and vessel ownership data. Lloyd's List has tracked five Aframax tankers, seven large oil carriers and one Suezmax vessel to an anonymous buyer through separate but related companies operating offshore Hong Kong and China that own similar vessels. The group of tankers was acquired between May and July 2022 for a total of $285 million, based on ship brokerage reports and market valuations. Since then, all but one of the tankers have been involved in the transshipment of russian oil cargoes at a high-risk transshipment hub located 860 nautical miles west of Portugal in international waters. The vessels purchased by the anonymous Chinese buyer are 15 years old or more, making it impossible for most major oil companies to charter them and impossible to obtain conventional financing. Oil exports from russia are the most important source of income for the kremlin regime to finance its war against Ukraine. The tax on oil production collected by the russian federation in 2023 amounted to 8.9 trillion rubles, or 31% of total federal revenues. According to CREA data for September 2024, russia's revenues from crude oil exported by sea amounted to 192 million euros per day, 86% of the total volume of russian marine crude oil was transported by shadow tankers, while tankers owned or insured in countries that impose price restrictions accounted for 14% of the total value of russian oil exported in September. The shadow tanker fleet continues to provide multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin bypassing sanctions, disguising its activities under the flags of third countries, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant environmental threats with significant economic costs to coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequate insurance of shadow fleet tankers.
HEIDI A
Vessel name
HEIDI A
IMO
9321976
Flag (Current)
Panama
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
 Transporting oil in violation of other restrictions
During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price-cap policy on russian oil, the tanker is involved in the export of oil to third countries from russian ports in the Baltic Sea and the Pacific region, and resorts to STS operations with russian oil in the Atlantic Ocean, the practice of turning off the AIS signal, and conducting so-called 'dark activities' at sea. The vessel is certified by the Korean Register (IACS). According to Lloyd's List, 'Heidi A' is linked to anonymous Chinese buyers who spent about $376 million to purchase 13 tankers to carry out risky ship-to-ship transportation of russian oil in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Ship-to-shore logistics hubs are a common feature of the scheme, allowing for the concealment of ownership and origin of cargo. In addition to the mid-Atlantic STS hub, there are also areas near the ports of Kalamata (Greece), Malta, Ceuta, and the Caucasus where ship-to-ship operations have been established for russian oil. STS's operations in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean are outside the jurisdiction of port authorities, with limited technical and operational oversight, which increases safety and environmental concerns due to the unknown insurance and vessel ownership data. Lloyd's List has tracked five Aframax tankers, seven large oil carriers and one Suezmax vessel to an anonymous buyer through separate but related companies operating offshore Hong Kong and China that own similar vessels. The group of tankers was acquired between May and July 2022 for a total of $285 million, based on ship brokerage reports and market valuations. Since then, all but one of the tankers have been involved in the transshipment of russian oil cargoes at a high-risk transshipment hub located 860 nautical miles west of Portugal in international waters. The vessels purchased by the anonymous Chinese buyer are 15 years old or more, making it impossible for most major oil companies to charter them and impossible to obtain conventional financing. Oil exports from russia are the most important source of income for the kremlin regime to finance its war against Ukraine. The tax on oil production collected by the russian federation in 2023 amounted to 8.9 trillion rubles, or 31% of total federal revenues. According to CREA data for September 2024, russia's revenues from crude oil exported by sea amounted to 192 million euros per day, 86% of the total volume of russian marine crude oil was transported by shadow tankers, while tankers owned or insured in countries that impose price restrictions accounted for 14% of the total value of russian oil exported in September. The shadow tanker fleet continues to provide multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin bypassing sanctions, disguising its activities under the flags of third countries, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant environmental threats with significant economic costs to coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequate insurance of shadow fleet tankers.
FUGA BLUEMARINE
Vessel name
FUGA BLUEMARINE
IMO
9235725
Flag (Current)
Panama
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
 Transporting oil in violation of other restrictions
During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price-cap policy on russian oil, the tanker is involved in the export of russian oil from the russian ports of Primorsk, Ust-Luga in the Baltic Sea, Kozmino in the Pacific region to third countries, in particular, India and China. The Israeli Ministry of Defense accuses the tanker 'FUGA BLUEMARINE' of transporting Iranian oil for the Quds Force and Hezbollah. The vessel has been certified by the Indian Register of Shipping (IACS) since September 2024 . The tanker is affiliated with the Cypriot company Lagosmarine Ltd (НE 402876) as the former manager of the vessel. The company's director is Δακης Μαυρουδης, who, in turn, is a director of another Cypriot company, Sparta Shipmanagement Limited (ΗΕ 393698). Lagosmarine Ltd and Sparta Shipmanagement Limited are registered at the same address in Cyprus. At the same time, Sparta Shipmanagement Limited is affiliated with Latvian citizen Alexey Haliavins, who in 2024 'helped' one of the largest russian oil and gas companies, Surgutneftegaz, to earn $1.4 billion on oil sales above the price ceiling for russian oil set by sanctions. In 2022, Haliavins claimed to be the general manager of Sparta Shipmanagement Limited, as well as the chairman of the board of directors and ultimate beneficial owner of the OGC group. Three Dubai-based companies are associated with Oleksiy Haliavins: Black Pearl Energy Trading LLC, OGC Shipping LLC, and Conmar Maritime. In 2023, Black Pearl Energy Trading LLC and OGC Shipping LLC purchased about 38 million barrels of oil from the russian company Surgutneftegaz at an average price of $83.7 per barrel, which exceeds the price cap for russian oil. In January-May 2024, only Black Pearl Energy Trading bought oil from the russian company, purchasing more than 20.6 million barrels at $83.7. As a result, the russian Surgutneftegaz earned about $1.4 billion bypassing the price ceiling. At the same time, tankers registered to Lagosmarine Ltd, which is affiliated with Sparta Shipmanagement Limited through a joint director, are constantly making voyages between the russian ports of Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Kozmino and India and China. According to customs documents, the same routes were used to move oil sold to Dubai companies linked to Haliavins. In his LinkedIn profile, Haliavins lists himself as a beneficiary and CEO of Conrad Management Company, which is listed as a sponsor company in the UAE residence permits of employees of the russian state-owned company JSC Foreign Economic Association Promsyryoimport (TIN 9704027750, sanctioned by USA and Ukraine). This russian company is involved in schemes to supply Iranian oil to Syria and the TOT of Crimea. Oil exports from russia are the most important source of income for the kremlin regime to finance the war against Ukraine. The tax on oil production collected by the russian federation in 2023 amounted to 8.9 trillion rubles, or 31% of total federal revenues. According to CREA data for September 2024, russia's revenues from crude oil exported by sea amounted to 192 million euros per day, 86% of the total volume of russian marine crude oil was transported by shadow tankers, while tankers owned or insured in countries that impose price restrictions accounted for 14% of the total value of russian oil exported in September. The shadow tanker fleet continues to generate multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin by circumventing sanctions by disguising its activities under third-country flags, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant environmental safety hazards with significant economic costs to coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequately insured shadow fleet tankers.
CORUM
Vessel name
CORUM
IMO
9544281
Flag (Current)
Panama
Vessel Type
Oil Products Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
 Transporting oil in violation of other restrictions
During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price-cap policy on russian oil, the tanker is involved in the export of oil to third countries from russian ports, and resorts to the practice of turning off the AIS signal, conducting so-called 'dark activities' at sea. The tanker 'CORUM' is certified by the Indian Register of Shipping (IACS). The tanker is managed by Prominent Shipmanagement LTD, established in 2022 in Hong Kong. Prominent is headed by Arjun Deshmukh, who worked for FESCO Wallem Shipmanagement, a joint venture between a russian company and Hong Kong's oldest ship manager. Prominent Shipmanagement LTD took over all tankers operated by K&O Shipmanagement FZE, a Dubai-based company affiliated with the sanctioned russian company Sovcomflot, and the vessels were included in the Indian Register of Shipping (the classification society with the largest market share of the so-called shadow fleet). PJSC Sovcomflot is the largest state-owned shipping company in russia, a key company for servicing and supporting offshore hydrocarbon production, transportation of russian oil, oil products, and liquefied gas amidst the sanctions restrictions imposed on russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The services provided by Sovcomflot are a significant source of income for russia, as more than 70% of russia's revenues come from energy sales, which allows it to finance its war against Ukraine. The main charterers of Sovcomflot vessels are the largest oil and gas companies and traders in russia. "Sovcomflot is involved in servicing major oil and gas projects in russia: 'Sakhalin-1', 'Sakhalin-2', 'Varandey', 'Prirazlomnoye', 'Novy Port', 'Yamal LNG' and others. Prior to russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the company's fleet consisted of about 145 vessels. After the sanctions were imposed, Sovcomflot transferred dozens of vessels to the ownership of companies it had set up, including in foreign jurisdictions, in order to circumvent them, and began the practice of constantly 'juggling' (transferring) vessels to related companies. According to experts, the tankers 're-registered' by Sovcomflot to related companies are part of the so-called 'shadow tanker fleet' of the russian federation to continue selling russian oil, oil products, and liquefied gas under western sanctions. Oil exports from russia are the most important source of income for the kremlin regime to finance the war against Ukraine. The tax on oil production collected by the russian federation in 2023 amounted to 8.9 trillion rubles, or 31% of total federal revenues. According to CREA data for September 2024, russia's revenues from crude oil exported by sea amounted to 192 million euros per day, 86% of the total volume of russian marine crude oil was transported by shadow tankers, while tankers owned or insured in countries that impose price restrictions accounted for 14% of the total value of russian oil exported in September. The shadow tanker fleet continues to generate multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin by circumventing sanctions by disguising its activities under third-country flags, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant environmental safety hazards with significant economic costs to coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequately insured shadow fleet tankers.
CLYDE NOBLE
Vessel name
CLYDE NOBLE
IMO
9282792
Flag (Current)
Palau
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
 Transporting oil in violation of other restrictions
During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price-cap policy on russian oil, the tanker is involved in the export of russian oil from the russian ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga in the Baltic Sea to third countries, in particular, India and China. The vessel is certified by the Registro Italiano Navale (IACS). The owner and manager of the tanker is the Cypriot company Lagosmarine Ltd (NE 402876), whose director is Δακης Μαυρουδης, who, in turn, is the director of another Cypriot company Sparta Shipmanagement Limited (ΗΕ 393698). Lagosmarine Ltd and Sparta Shipmanagement Limited are registered at the same address in Cyprus. At the same time, Sparta Shipmanagement Limited is affiliated with Latvian citizen Alexey Haliavins, who in 2024 'helped' one of the largest russian oil and gas companies, Surgutneftegaz, to earn $1.4 billion on oil sales above the price ceiling for russian oil set by sanctions. In 2022, Haliavins claimed to be the general manager of Sparta Shipmanagement Limited, as well as the chairman of the board of directors and ultimate beneficial owner of the OGC group. Three Dubai-based companies are associated with Oleksiy Haliavins: Black Pearl Energy Trading LLC, OGC Shipping LLC, and Conmar Maritime. In 2023, Black Pearl Energy Trading LLC and OGC Shipping LLC purchased about 38 million barrels of oil from the russian company Surgutneftegaz at an average price of $83.7 per barrel, which exceeds the price cap for russian oil. In January-May 2024, only Black Pearl Energy Trading bought oil from the russian company, purchasing more than 20.6 million barrels at $83.7. As a result, the russian Surgutneftegaz earned about $1.4 billion bypassing the price ceiling. At the same time, tankers registered to Lagosmarine Ltd, which is affiliated with Sparta Shipmanagement Limited through a joint director, are constantly making voyages between the russian ports of Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Kozmino and India and China. According to customs documents, the same routes were used to move oil sold to Dubai companies linked to Halsavins. The Israeli Ministry of Defense accuses one of Lagosmarine's tankers, 'Fuga Bluemarine', in transporting Iranian oil for the Quds Force and Hezbollah. In his LinkedIn profile, Haliavins lists himself as a beneficiary and CEO of Conrad Management Company, which is listed as a sponsor company in the UAE residence permits of employees of the russian state-owned company JSC Foreign Economic Association Promsyryoimport (TIN 9704027750, sanctioned by USA and Ukraine). This russian company is involved in schemes to supply Iranian oil to Syria and the TOT of Crimea. Oil exports from russia are the most important source of income for the kremlin regime to finance the war against Ukraine. The tax on oil production collected by the russian federation in 2023 amounted to 8.9 trillion rubles, or 31% of total federal revenues. According to CREA data for September 2024, russia's revenues from crude oil exported by sea amounted to 192 million euros per day, 86% of the total volume of russian marine crude oil was transported by shadow tankers, while tankers owned or insured in countries that impose price restrictions accounted for 14% of the total value of russian oil exported in September. The shadow tanker fleet continues to generate multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin by circumventing sanctions by disguising its activities under third-country flags, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant environmental safety hazards with significant economic costs to coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequately insured shadow fleet tankers.
CAPTAIN KOSTICHEV
Vessel name
CAPTAIN KOSTICHEV
IMO
9301392
Flag (Current)
Panama
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
 Transporting oil in violation of other restrictions
During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price-cap policy on russian oil, the tanker is involved in exporting russian oil from russian ports in the Baltic Sea and the Pacific region to China and India, and resorts to the practice of turning off the AIS signal and conducting so-called 'dark activities' at sea. The vessel 'CAPTAIN KOSTICHEV' is certified by the Indian regulator Indian Register of Shipping (IACS). Oil exports from russia are the most important source of income for the kremlin regime to finance its war against Ukraine. The tax on oil production collected by russia in 2023 amounted to 8.9 trillion rubles, or 31% of total federal revenues. According to CREA data for September 2024, russia's revenues from crude oil exported by sea amounted to 192 million euros per day, 86% of the total volume of russian marine crude oil was transported by 'shadow' tankers, while tankers owned or insured in countries implementing price restrictions accounted for 14% of the total value of russian oil exported in September. The vessel, through its related companies, including Stream Ship Management FZCO, Sun Ship Management, Oil Tankers SCF MGMT FZCO, SCF Management Services Cyprus, is affiliated with the sanctioned PJSC Sovcomflot, the largest state-owned shipping company in russia, a key company for servicing and supporting offshore hydrocarbon production, transportation of russian oil, oil products, and liquefied gas amid sanctions restrictions on russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The services provided by Sovcomflot are a significant source of income for russia, as more than 70% of russia's revenues come from energy sales, which allows it to finance its war against Ukraine. The main charterers of Sovcomflot vessels are the largest oil and gas companies and traders in russia. 'Sovcomflot' is involved in servicing large oil and gas projects in russia: 'Sakhalin-1', 'Sakhalin-2', 'Varandey', 'Prirazlomnoye', 'Novy Port', 'Yamal LNG' and others. Prior to russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the company's fleet consisted of about 145 vessels. After the sanctions were imposed, in order to circumvent them, Sovcomflot transferred dozens of vessels to the ownership of companies it created, including in foreign jurisdictions, and started the practice of constantly 'juggling' (transferring) vessels to related companies. According to experts, the tankers 're-registered' by Sovcomflot to related companies are part of the so-called 'shadow tanker fleet' of the russian federation to continue selling russian oil, oil products, and liquefied gas under western sanctions. The shadow tanker fleet continues to provide multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin bypassing sanctions, disguising its activities under the flags of third countries, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant environmental threats with significant economic costs to coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequate insurance of shadow fleet tankers.
GREAT JACOMBO
Vessel name
GREAT JACOMBO
IMO
9319703
Flag (Current)
Gabon
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
 Transporting oil in violation of other restrictions
During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price-cap policy on russian oil, the tanker is involved in the export of russian oil to third countries from russian ports in the Baltic, Black seas, and the Pacific region, and resorts to the practice of turning off the AIS signal, conducting so-called 'dark activities' at sea. The vessel 'GREAT JACOMBO' is certified by the Indian regulator Indian Register of Shipping (IACS). Oil exports from russia are the most important source of income for the kremlin regime to finance its war against Ukraine. The tax on oil production collected by russia in 2023 amounted to 8.9 trillion rubles, or 31% of total federal revenues. According to CREA data for September 2024, russia's revenues from crude oil exported by sea amounted to 192 million euros per day, 86% of the total volume of russian marine crude oil was transported by 'shadow' tankers, while tankers owned or insured in countries that impose price restrictions accounted for 14% of the total value of russian oil exported in September. The tanker 'GREAT JACOMBO' is affiliated with the Indian company Gatik Ship Management, one of the leading operators of the so-called 'shadow' fleet involved in the transportation of russian crude oil under Western sanctions, and the company Orion Ship Management LLP, which is related to Gatik, which in 2023, together with Caishan Ship Management, Plutos Ship Management, Gaurik Ship Management LLP, Geras Ship Management, Girik Ship Management, Galena Ship Management, Nautilus Shipping (India), Ark Seakonnect Shipmanagment LLC, Zidan Ship Management, was involved in a scheme to 'juggle' vessels operated by Gatik Ship Management to avoid sanctions. Gatik Ship Management and Orion Ship Management were the previous managers of the vessel. Tankers operated/managed by the Indian Gatik Ship Management continue to be used by related companies and call at russian ports. Against the backdrop of sanctions, russia is using a scheme of 'juggling' ships between related companies to conceal oil exports outside the price cap and other restrictions, as well as to conceal the real owners of ships, and to ensure unimpeded transportation of fossil fuels by a 'shadow' fleet of outdated oil tankers, creates new companies for these purposes (in the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Turkey, Mauritius, Seychelles, and other jurisdictions) with non-transparent organizational and ownership structures. In order to implement this scheme, technical/commercial management and ship owners are constantly changing, and vessels are renamed with a change of flag, MMSI, call-sign, including for sanctioned vessels. Shadow fleet vessels operate under 'convenient flags', which allows them to conceal their true origin and avoid control by international organizations and insurance companies. Almost all vessels involved in the transportation of russian oil by the shadow fleet have been certified by the Indian regulator Indian Register of Shipping (IACS) since 2022. The certification of shadow fleet vessels allows the shipowner/operator to insure the vessels, which, in turn, allows the vessels to enter ports and pass through various specific sea routes (straits, canals, etc.). The 'shadow' fleet, transporting huge volumes of crude oil through heavily trafficked routes through narrow straits close to the coastline, without proper P&I insurance, with automatic identification systems disabled, threatens an environmental disaster with significant economic costs to be borne by the affected coastal countries and/or the international community. The recent incidents off Malaysia only underscore the need for swift action to curb the potentially devastating impact of the growing 'shadow fleet'. 'Shadow' tankers have already been involved in 50 incidents from the Danish Straits all the way to Malaysia since russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to CREA, from January to August 2024, the number of shadow tankers crossing the Danish Straits in Europe increased by 277% compared to the same period in 2022, with 64% of the 46 million tons of russian marine oil transported through the Danish Straits being transported by shadow tankers. In the same period, the number of shadow tankers in the Straits of Dover and Gibraltar increased by 355% compared to 2022, transporting 67% of the 37 million tons of oil through the straits. The Suez Canal experienced a staggering 649% increase in shadow tanker traffic, with 69% of the 52 million tons of russian crude oil passing through it being transported by these vessels. Thus, the 'shadow fleet' of the russian federation continues to provide multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin bypassing sanctions, disguising its activities under the flags of third countries, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant threats to environmental safety with significant economic costs for coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequate insurance of shadow fleet tankers.
OCEAN FAYE
Vessel name
OCEAN FAYE
IMO
9321689
Flag (Current)
Honduras
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
 Transporting oil in violation of other restrictions
During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price-cap policy on russian oil, the tanker is involved in the export of oil to third countries from russian ports, and resorts to the practice of turning off the AIS signal, conducting so-called 'dark activities' at sea. The vessel is certified by the China Classification Society (IACS). The tanker is affiliated with One Moon Marine Services LLC (UAE, under UK sanctions), a company affiliated with the sanctioned operators of the so-called 'shadow' fleet involved in the export of russian oil. After its establishment, One Moon Marine Services LLC 'received' a number of tankers, including the sanctioned vessel 'Ocean Amz', from the shadow fleet operators Radiating World Shipping Services and Voyages Shipping Services. Since November 2023, One Moon Marine Services LLC has started transporting russian oil without P&I insurance. Other vessels were transferred to Alqutb Ashamali Marine Services, Breath Shipping Services, etc. The constant change of owners and managers of vessels to avoid sanctions and conceal the true beneficiaries of the vessels is typical for the so-called 'shadow fleet' involved in the russian oil and oil products trade. Oil exports from russia are the most important source of income for the kremlin regime to finance the war against Ukraine. The tax on oil production collected by the russian federation in 2023 amounted to 8.9 trillion rubles, or 31% of russia's total federal revenues. According to CREA data for September 2024, russia's revenues from crude oil exported by sea amount to €192 million per day, 86% of the total volume of russian marine crude oil was transported by shadow tankers, while tankers owned or insured in countries implementing price restrictions accounted for 14% of the total value of russian oil exported in September. The shadow tanker fleet continues to generate multibillion-dollar revenues for the Kremlin by circumventing sanctions, disguising its activities under third-country flags, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant environmental safety hazards with significant economic costs to coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequately insured shadow fleet tankers.
Port Olya-3
Vessel name
Port Olya-3
IMO
9481910
Flag (Current)
russian federation
Vessel Type
General cargo ship
Category
Transportation of military cargo
 Weapons and military equipment
The vessel is involved in the delivery of ballistic missiles from Iran to russia (Olya port, Astrakhan region) in August-September 2024. At the end of 2023, Iran and russia agreed to transfer weapons systems from Iran to russia. It is known that among the systems that Iran agreed to provide to russia are Fath-360 short-range ballistic missiles (CRBM). In early July 2024, about 40 russian servicemen allegedly traveled to Iran to train on Fath-360 CRBM missiles. In August 2024, 25 20-foot-long containers were loaded with ballistic missiles at a missile facility in Iran. Each 20-foot-long container can hold up to nine CRBMs. In mid-August 2024, these 25 containers were transported to the port of Amirabad on the Caspian Sea in Iran and then loaded onto the "Port Olya-3" vessel by August 30. Subsequently, by September 04, 2024, these 25 containers were unloaded from the vessel "Port Olya-3" and loaded onto railroad cars in the port of Olya (russia). The vessel is owned by a russian sanctioned company, MG-Flot LLC, associated with Astrakhan businessman Jamaldin Emirmagomedovich Pashayev, who built his business around the Olya trade port in Astrakhan region. This particular location was proposed as a key logistics hub for the North-South international transport corridor, the creation and construction of which was overseen and controlled by former russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov. The key purpose of the transport corridor was to trade with sanctioned Iran, which could import and export goods via the North-South route. On 10 September 2024, USA imposed sanctions on the vessel.
YANA V
Vessel name
YANA V
IMO
9931226
Flag (Current)
russian federation
Vessel Type
General cargo ship
Category
Transportation of military cargo
 Weapons and military equipment
The vessel is involved in the delivery of military equipment from the russian federation and the territory of the TOT of Zaporizhzhia region (Ukraine), and calls at the ports of the TOT of Crimea (Ukraine). On May 23, 2023, the vessel 'YANA V', which left the Caucasian Sea Commercial Port of the russian federation, crossed the Azov Sea and entered the sea space of the temporarily occupied Berdiansk Sea Commercial Port of Ukraine, where it unloaded military equipment delivered from the territory of the russian Federation to berth 10. After that, on May 28, 2023, the military equipment was taken out of the port under the protection of the 'Pantsyr-C1' anti-aircraft missile and gun system to the permanent deployment points of the russian armed forces in the TOT of Zaporizhzhia region. The authorized body of Ukraine has served a notice of suspicion of aiding and abetting in the conduct of aggressive war on the Deputy Minister of Transport of the russian federation, Alexander Poshyvay, and the head of the Federal State Budgetary Institution “Administration of the Sea Ports of the Azov Sea” Sergey Safonichev, as well as on the change of the previously announced suspicion to the head of the Federal Agency for Sea and River Transport of the russian federation Zakhary Dzhioev. Since September 2022, russian officials have allowed the use of the capacities of the Berdiansk seaport for the transportation of military equipment and personnel of the russian military formations, organized and provided conditions for the timely transportation by sea of personnel of the armed forces and other armed formations of the russian federation, military equipment, weapons to the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, thereby providing means and removing obstacles for the top military and political leadership of the russian federation to wage an aggressive war against Ukraine.
War & Sanctions 2024