Sea vessels

The vessel is involved in the export of Iranian oil in violation of sanctions and the transportation of oil to a significant number of refineries in China. According to the United Against Nuclear Iran, in 2023 the vessel was among the top 10 tankers that transported the largest volumes of Iranian oil in violation of sanctions. On October 11, 2024, USA imposed sanctions on the vessel within the framework of expanding sanctions against Iran's oil and petrochemical sectors.

The tanker is affiliated with Delnaz Ship Management Sdn Bhd, which was sanctioned by USA on October 11, 2024 for providing material, sponsorship or financial, material or technological support, or goods or services to support the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) within the framework of expanding restrictions on the oil and petrochemical sector of Iran. On October 11, 2024, USA imposed sanctions on the tanker as a property in which Delnaz Ship Management Sdn Bhd has an interest.

The tanker is involved in the transportation of hundreds of metric tons of Iranian oil to China in several shipments on behalf of the sanctioned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and China Concord Petroleum Co Ltd. The tanker is affiliated with the Chinese company Derecttor Company Limited, which was sanctioned by USA on October 11, 2024 as part of the expansion of restrictions on Iran's oil and petrochemical sectors. Also, on October 11, 2024, USA imposed sanctions on the vessel as a property in which Derecttor Company Limited has an interest.

The vessel was involved in the offloading of fossil fuels produced at the sanctioned russian Arctic LNG-2 facility on 25 August 2024 by STS north of the Suez Canal, with AIS disabled, in violation of international maritime law, from the sanctioned LNG tanker ‘Pioneer’. ‘Arctic LNG-2' is the second large-capacity project of the sanctioned Novatek PJSC for natural gas extraction and LNG production on the Gydan Peninsula after Yamal LNG. In November 2023 and February 2024, USA and United Kingdom respectively imposed sanctions on the russian Arctic LNG-2 project, which is of strategic importance for the government of the russian federation. On 23 August 2024, USA imposed sanctions on the LNG tanker ‘Pioneer’ as part of the restrictions on entities supporting the development of the russian ‘Arctic LNG-2’ and other future energy projects. On 05 September 2024, USA imposed sanctions on the LNG tanker ‘New Energy’ as part of the expansion of restrictive measures against the russian energy sector in connection with attempts to export LNG from the sanctioned ‘Arctic LNG-2’. On 26 September 2024, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on a vessel involved in the russian LNG sector.

Since the end of 2021, it has been involved in regular grain transportation from the TOT of Crimea (in particular, from Kerch and Sevastopol) to Turkish ports (mostly Samsun) with the AIS signal turned off, following the traditional scheme of concealing calls to Ukrainian ports in the TOT of Ukraine. The Turkish agricultural company Bek Tarim, the russian company Fast LLC (TIN 2376000774), and Petrokhleb-Kuban LLC (TIN 2310109650) are involved in the export of Ukrainian grain by ship. The vessel's manager is the russian Kuban Marine Company LLC (IMO 6089531, TIN 2310213041), affiliated with Petrokhleb-Kuban LLC. Kuban Maritime Company LLC also operates another vessels that make illegal voyages to the closed ports of the TOT of Crimea.

The vessel is involved in the transport of weapons and operates on the Ust-Luga-Baltic container line, transporting containers, rolling stock and general cargo. In 2022-2023, "Sparta II" crossed the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits despite the sanctions. In May 2022, USA imposed sanctions on three vessels, including the Sparta II, affiliated with the russian sanctioned company Oboronlogistika LLC, a russian shipping company operating as part of the military construction complex of the russian ministry of defence. The main tasks of Oboronlogistika LLC are to meet the needs of the russian ministry of defence in the transportation, storage and production of military and special-purpose goods. Oboronlogistika LLC is the sole provider of transport services for the ministry of defence of russia, transporting troops to certain regions of russia and delivering cargo to the temporarily occupied Crimea (Ukraine).

It can transport any kind of lumber, "20" and "40" containers, grain, general cargo (IMO classes 2-9). It is involved in the supply of goods to the russian army, as well as the supply of military vehicles from russia to Syria. The vessel is involved in the theft of Ukrainian grain from the TOT of Crimea (Ukraine) and calls at ports in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine with the AIS onboard station signals switched off. In particular, in June 2023, the vessel transported Ukrainian grain from the port of Feodosia (TOT Crimea), In January 2014, the ship entered the temporarily occupied Sevastopol (Komyshova Bay) to load grain. The vessel is owned and operated by the sanctioned russian shipping company OJSC Northern shipping company, which is affiliated with the russian ministry of defence, in particular, it provides services under state defence contracts for the transportation of goods in the interests of the russian ministry of defence. It is one of the largest shipping companies in north-west russia, engaged in shipping worldwide, including along the Northern Sea Route. The company's fleet consists of versatile dry bulk carriers that transport all types of cargo, including radioactive and dangerous goods. It comprises 30 vessels for various purposes: 18 vessels of the transport fleet, 7 of the dredging fleet and 5 of the auxiliary fleet. The company carries out sea liner, tram, multimodal transport, cargo delivery to unequipped shores, towing of various objects, technical management (repair, supply, shipping and warehousing services), provides crew training, corrects nautical charts, and provides mixed (river-sea) navigation vessels with inland waterway charts. In May 2022, USA imposed sanctions on the russian OJSC Northern shipping company and 27 of its vessels, including the vessel "Inzhener Trubin", due to the fact that the company's vessels are involved in the military logistics sector of the russian federation, transporting tanks and other military equipment for the russian armed forces. Despite the sanctions, the Turkish company Denkar vessel Construction Incorporated Company provided repair services to the russian OJSC Northern shipping company for three sanctioned vessels - "Inzhener Trubin", "Inzhener Veshnyakov" and "Kapitan Kokovin". In September 2023, the Turkish company was subject to US sanctions restrictions for such actions.

The vessel is involved in the military logistics network of the russian federation. The vessel is owned by the Cypriot company Ibex Shipping Inc. There is no company with this name in the Cyprus company register, while the company's IMO number corresponds to the one registered in the Marshall Islands. The vessel is operated by the sanctioned russian company LLC Shipping Company Asia, which is a cargo carrier for the russian ministry of defense. In December 2023, USA imposed sanctions on the vessel and affiliated shipping companies involved in the transfer of ammunition between the DPRK and russia.

It is involved in the supply of jet fuel and other important cargo to the Middle East (to the group of Russian troops in Syria in the interests of the russian Ministry of Defence), and calls at the ports of the TOT of Ukraine (in particular, the port of Crimea). In 2024, three tankers ‘Azov’ (IMO 8943260), ‘Koysug’ (IMO 8883252), and ‘Nizami Ganjavi’ (IMO 9369617) were added to the list of vessels used by the russian federation to make covert deliveries to Syria in the interests of the russian ministry of defence. During 2024, the vessels were repeatedly used by the russian federation to carry out maritime transportation from the black sea ports of the russian federation to Syria under the traditional scheme of concealing entries/exits to/from ports in Syria by switching off their transponders in the Mediterranean north or south of Cyprus. Aviation fuel and diesel were supplied to Syria from russian ports (Azov port), petrol - from Iran. Such steps were taken by Russia after the successful attacks in 2023 by the Ukrainian Defence Forces against the russian tanker ‘Sig’ in the Black Sea, which was carrying out sea transport to Syria to supply jet fuel to the russian troops in Syria.

During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price-cap policy on russian oil, the tanker is involved in the export of russian oil from russian ports to third countries, and resorts to the practice of turning off the AIS signal, conducting so-called 'dark activities' at sea. Since April 2024, the owner, manager and commercial manager of the tanker has been an unknown company, Qatif Maritime Inc (Seychelles), and the ISM manager is the Indian company Beacon Ship Management. The fleet of the shipowner and the ship manager consists only of the tanker 'AFKADA'. The vessel is certified by the Indian regulator Indian Register of Shipping (IACS). The tanker 'AFKADA' is affiliated with the Indian company Gatik Ship Management, one of the leading operators of the so-called 'shadow' fleet involved in the transportation of russian crude oil under Western sanctions, and the company Galena Ship Management, which is affiliated with Gatik, which in 2023, together with Caishan Ship Management, Plutos Ship Management, Gaurik Ship Management LLP, Geras Ship Management, Girik Ship Management, Orion Ship Management LLP, Nautilus Shipping (India), Ark Seakonnect Shipmanagement LLC, Zidan Ship Management, was involved in a scheme to 'juggle' vessels managed by Gatik Ship Management to avoid sanctions. Gatik Ship Management and Galena Ship Management were the previous managers of the tanker 'AFKADA'. Tankers operated/managed by India's Gatik Ship Management continue to be used by related companies and call at russian ports. As sanctions are being imposed, russia uses a scheme of "juggling" ships between related companies to conceal oil exports outside the price cap and other restrictions, as well as to hide the real owners of ships, and to ensure unimpeded transportation of fossil fuels by a 'shadow' fleet of obsolete oil tankers, creates new companies for these purposes (in the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Turkey, Mauritius, Seychelles, and other jurisdictions) with non-transparent organizational and ownership structures. In order to implement this scheme, technical/commercial management and ship owners are constantly changing, and vessels are renamed with a change of flag, MMSI, call-sign, including for sanctioned vessels. Shadow fleet vessels operate under “convenient flags”, which allows them to conceal their true origin and avoid control by international organizations and insurance companies. Almost all vessels that are involved in the transportation of russian oil by the shadow fleet since 2022 have been certified by the Indian regulator Indian Register of Shipping (IACS). The certification of shadow fleet vessels allows the shipowner/operator to insure the vessels, which, in turn, allows the vessels to enter ports and pass through various specific sea routes (straits, canals, etc.). The 'shadow' fleet, transporting huge volumes of crude oil through heavily trafficked routes through narrow straits close to the coastline, without proper P&I insurance, with automatic identification systems disabled, threatens an environmental disaster with significant economic costs to be borne by the affected coastal countries and/or the international community. The recent incidents off Malaysia only underscore the need for swift action to curb the potentially devastating impact of the growing 'shadow fleet'. 'Shadow' tankers have already been involved in 50 incidents from the Danish Straits all the way to Malaysia since russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to CREA, from January to August 2024, the number of shadow tankers crossing the Danish Straits in Europe increased by 277% compared to the same period in 2022, with 64% of the 46 million tons of russian marine oil transported through the Danish Straits being transported by shadow tankers. In the same period, the number of shadow tankers in the Straits of Dover and Gibraltar increased by 355% compared to 2022, transporting 67% of the 37 million tons of oil through the straits. The Suez Canal experienced a staggering 649% increase in shadow tanker traffic, with 69% of the 52 million tons of russian crude oil passing through it being transported by these vessels. Thus, the 'shadow fleet' of the russian federation continues to provide multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin bypassing sanctions, disguising its activities under the flags of third countries, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant threats to environmental safety with significant economic costs for coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequate insurance of shadow fleet tankers.

It is affiliated with the sanctioned company Plio Energy Cargo Shipping Opc, which operates the sanctioned LNG tanker ‘New Energy’, involved in the transportation of russian fossil fuels from the sanctioned ‘Arctic LNG-2’ facility. ‘Arctic LNG-2’ is the second large-capacity project of the sanctioned Novatek PJSC for natural gas extraction and liquefied natural gas production on the Gydan Peninsula after Yamal LNG. In November 2023 and February 2024, USA and the United Kingdom respectively imposed sanctions on the russian Arctic LNG-2 project, which is of strategic importance for the government of the russian federation. On 05 September 2024, as part of the expansion of restrictive measures on the russian energy sector, USA imposed sanctions on the LNG tanker Mulan as part of the attempts to export LNG from the sanctioned Arctic LNG-2 project, in connection with the property in which Plio Energy Cargo Shipping Opc has an interest.

It is involved in the supply of jet fuel and other important cargo to the Middle East (to the group of Russian troops in Syria in the interests of the russian Ministry of Defence), and calls at the ports of the TOT of Ukraine (in particular, the port of Crimea). In 2024, three tankers ‘Azov’ (IMO 8943260), ‘Koysug’ (IMO 8883252), and ‘Nizami Ganjavi’ (IMO 9369617) were added to the list of vessels used by the russian federation to make covert deliveries to Syria in the interests of the russian ministry of defence. During 2024, the vessels were repeatedly used by the russian federation to carry out maritime transportation from the black sea ports of the russian federation to Syria under the traditional scheme of concealing entries/exits to/from ports in Syria by switching off their transponders in the Mediterranean north or south of Cyprus. Aviation fuel and diesel were supplied to Syria from russian ports (Azov port), petrol - from Iran. Such steps were taken by Russia after the successful attacks in 2023 by the Ukrainian Defence Forces against the russian tanker ‘Sig’ in the Black Sea, which was carrying out sea transport to Syria to supply jet fuel to the russian troops in Syria.