Marine and Aircraft
Vessels
Airports and Ports
involved in the transportation of weapons, stolen Ukrainian products and in the circumvention of sanctions
Total number:
817
Marine vessels
100
Captains
Updated: 09.04.2025
Maritime logistics is critically important for building up the aggressor`s military capabilities, moving troops, obtaining weapons and sanctioned goods, and trading stolen goods. Aggressors transport weapons through international straits on civilian merchant vessels. Exporting fossil fuels to circumvent sanctions is the main source of income for russia and Iran. The shadow tanker fleet and ships without ice class in the Arctic threaten an environmental disaster. Through the sale of agricultural products from the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories, russia finances the war and maintains the loyalty of its allies, Iran and the DPRK.
Together we can stop this to restore peace and security
Actions to be taken:
  • to sanction the vessels on the list below, as well as all related companies and individuals (owners, operators, managers, executives, senior crew members)
  • to prohibit the entry of such vessels into ports, territorial waters, EEZs and international straits, and the sale of spare parts for them
 
  • to require bank statements to confirm compliance with the price-cap when receiving insurance and other services
  • to involve financial and specialized institutions in the gathering of evidence, to publish the results of investigations, and to apply real penalties, including significant fines
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Air vessels Ports Airports
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total: 817
CERES I
Vessel name
CERES I
IMO
9229439
Flag (Current)
Sao Tome and Principe Sao Tome and Principe
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
icon arrow-tree Transportation of Iranian crude oil/petroleum products
The tanker has been involved in the transportation of Iranian oil since at least 2021, STS transfers of Iranian oil. In particular, in January 2024, near Singapore, CERES I transferred almost 300,000 metric tons of Iranian oil from ship to ship in the interests of the sanctioned Jazira Das International Products Trading LLC (UAE), China Concord Petroleum Company (CCPC) and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is one of the largest oil and gas companies in the world and is controlled by the Iranian Ministry of Oil. NIOC and its subsidiaries explore, produce, transport, process and export oil and natural gas in Iran. NIOC's oil deals, including those of its subsidiaries, are used to generate revenue for the IRGC-QF (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and Hizballah. Jazira Das International Products Trading LLC is a UAE-registered company involved in falsifying documents to 'disguise' barrels of Iranian oil from the sanctioned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) as Emirati oil, coordinating many NIOC oil shipments to the sanctioned China Concord Petroleum Company to transport millions of barrels of oil, and concealing NIOC's involvement in the supply. According to the American human rights group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), which monitors Iran-related tanker traffic using satellite data, the vessel is involved in the transportation of Iranian crude oil and/or petroleum products and has been included in the UANI's 'Ghost Armada' list since April 2021. Also, the tanker CERES I was included by UANI in the list of tankers of the Maduro-Khamenei Oil Alliance involved in the transportation of Iranian and Venezuelan oil. On June 11, 2022, Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro and former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi signed a 20-year cooperation agreement to expand ties in the oil and petrochemical industries, military and economic spheres. Since then, bilateral ties have been developing: in 2023, Iran supplied more than 12 million barrels of crude oil and gas condensate, and Venezuela supplied about the same amount of fuel oil to Iran in return. Most of the cargo is transported by vessels of the sanctioned National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) in both directions: Iranian oil and gas are unloaded in Venezuelan ports, and the same NITC tankers load Venezuelan fuel oil on the way back to China. A significant number of non-NITC vessels flying foreign (non-Iranian) flags are also involved in the trade. Also, according to UANI, the CERES I tanker is one of 16 oil tankers that have switched from Iranian oil to russian oil as of July 2022. In July 2024, the CERES I tanker was involved in a collision with another oil tanker, causing an oil spill in international waters near Malaysia. During the collision, the CERES I's tracking signals did not correspond to its position, which prevented it from communicating with the other vessel. On December 03, 2024, USA imposed sanctions on the vessel.
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FIONA II
Vessel name
FIONA II
IMO
9262766
Flag (Current)
Panama Panama
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
icon arrow-tree Transportation of Iranian crude oil/petroleum products
The tanker is involved in the transportation of sanctioned Iranian oil, has been involved in the transportation of illegal Iranian oil since at least 2023, and has been engaged in deceptive practices and dark activities near Iran and Malaysia. In July 2024, the FIONA II transported almost 2 million barrels of Iranian crude oil to China on behalf of the sanctioned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is one of the largest oil and gas companies in the world and is controlled by the Iranian Ministry of Oil. NIOC and its subsidiaries explore, produce, transport, process and export oil and natural gas in Iran. NIOC's oil deals, including those of its subsidiaries, are used to generate revenue for the IRGC-QF (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and Hizballah. Iran relies on an extensive network of tankers and ship management companies in many jurisdictions to transport its oil to foreign customers, using deceptive tactics (falsification of documentation, manipulation of ship tracking systems, and constant changes of ship names and flags). One of the most commonly used tactics to evade oil sanctions is 'flag hopping' in various national registries, which allows the vessel to carry out transportation and have the right to moor. This tactic is often accompanied by the creation of fictitious companies, change of owners, managers, ship names, and change of physical markings of the vessel. Some shipowners deliberately use flag registries to evade sanctions, many of which do not have the resources and capabilities to track and verify the history of ships. On December 03, 2024, the United States imposed sanctions on the vessel.
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ION
Vessel name
ION
IMO
9183271
Flag (Current)
Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Kitts and Nevis
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
icon arrow-tree Transporting russian crude oil/oil products in violation of other restrictions
The tanker is involved in the transportation of Iranian oil, export of russian oil from russian ports in the Baltic Sea, the Pacific Ocean region to third countries, and deceptive practices, including AIS manipulation/spoofing. The international NGO Greenpeace refers to the tanker as part of a shadow fleet of tankers transporting russian crude oil around the world through the Baltic Sea, the Kadetsky Canal area in the Mecklenburg Bay, and threatening the environment. According to the American human rights group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), which monitors Iran-related tanker traffic using satellite data, the vessel was involved in the transportation of Iranian oil. According to UANI, the tanker was engaged in AIS signal spoofing while loading crude oil from Sirri Island (Iran) in August 2021, as well as MMSI spoofing by posing as another vessel while unloading Iranian oil in Banias (Syria) in September 2021. In particular, during the offloading of Iranian oil in Banias (Syria) in September 2021, according to AIS data, the vessel was anchored west of the Cyprus STS transmission zone, while sending AIS messages from Spain at 36.179, 5.926. Since the beginning of russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, more than 90 vessels that previously helped Tehran export Iranian export oil are now helping russia transport russian crude oil/oil products. In May 2022, UANI first predicted that russia would turn to the 'ghost armada' to ensure oil flows to its Chinese partner. UANI also included the tanker in the list of tankers of the Maduro-Khamenei Oil Alliance involved in the transportation of Iranian and Venezuelan oil. On June 11, 2022, Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro and former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi signed a 20-year cooperation agreement to expand ties in the oil and petrochemical industries, military and economic spheres. Since then, bilateral ties have been developing: in 2023, Iran supplied more than 12 million barrels of crude oil and gas condensate, and Venezuela supplied about the same amount of fuel oil to Iran in return. Most of the cargo is transported by vessels of the sanctioned National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) in both directions: Iranian oil and gas are unloaded in Venezuelan ports, and the same NITC tankers load Venezuelan fuel oil on the way back to China. A significant number of non-NITC vessels flying foreign (not Iranian) flags are also involved in the trade.
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AMELL
Vessel name
AMELL
IMO
9257993
Flag (Current)
The Gambia The Gambia
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Transportation of fossil fuels
icon arrow-tree Transporting russian crude oil/oil products in violation of other restrictions
The tanker is engaged in the transportation of sanctioned Iranian and russian crude oil/oil products using deceptive, high-risk practices. The vessel called at a russian port, where the price of oil was constantly trading above the upper limit of the price-cap for russian crude oil/oil products. The international public organization Greenpeace refers to the tanker as a shadow fleet of tankers transporting russian oil around the world and threatening the environment. According to United Against Nuclear Iran, the tanker is involved in the transportation of sanctioned Iranian oil and, after Western sanctions were imposed, switched to the transportation of sanctioned russian oil. Until October 2021, the vessel was affiliated through a number of companies, including the sanctioned Sun Ship Management, with the sanctioned PJSC Sovcomflot, the largest state-owned shipping company in russia for servicing and supporting offshore hydrocarbon production, transportation of russian crude oil, oil products, and liquefied gas. The main charterers of PJSC Sovcomflot's vessels are russia's largest oil and gas companies and traders. PJSC Sovcomflot is involved in servicing major oil and gas projects in russia: Sakhalin-1, Sakhalin-2, Varandey, Prirazlomnoye, Novy Port, Yamal LNG and others. The tanker is associated with Odine Marine Incorporated, the former owner of the vessel, which was sanctioned by USA on January 10, 2025 for its activities in the energy sector of the russian economy. On January 10, 2025, USA imposed sanctions on a vessel considered to be part of the shadow fleet as a property in which Odine Marine Incorporated has an interest.
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War & Sanctions 2025
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