Marine and Aircraft
Vessels
Airports and Ports
involved in the transportation of weapons, stolen Ukrainian products and in the circumvention of sanctions
Total number:
1067
Marine vessels
155
Captains
Updated: 18.08.2025
Maritime logistics is critically important for building up the aggressor`s military capabilities, moving troops, obtaining weapons and sanctioned goods, and trading stolen goods. Aggressors transport weapons through international straits on civilian merchant vessels. Exporting fossil fuels to circumvent sanctions is the main source of income for russia and Iran. The shadow tanker fleet and ships without ice class in the Arctic threaten an environmental disaster. Through the sale of agricultural products from the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories, russia finances the war and maintains the loyalty of its allies, Iran and the DPRK.
Together we can stop this to restore peace and security
Actions to be taken:
  • to sanction the vessels on the list below, as well as all related companies and individuals (owners, operators, managers, executives, senior crew members)
  • to prohibit the entry of such vessels into ports, territorial waters, EEZs and international straits, and the sale of spare parts for them
 
  • to require bank statements to confirm compliance with the price-cap when receiving insurance and other services
  • to involve financial and specialized institutions in the gathering of evidence, to publish the results of investigations, and to apply real penalties, including significant fines
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Air vessels Ports Airports
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total: 1067
YAZ
Vessel name
YAZ
IMO
9735323
Flag (Current)
russian federation russian federation
Vessel Type
Chemical/Oil Products Tanker
Category
Cargo transportation from/to ТОТ of Ukraine
icon arrow-tree Calling ports of the TOT
The vessel is involved in the military logistics network of the russian federation in the interests of the ministry of defense of the russian federation on the territory of Syria, in particular, for the movement of fuel and lubricants (aviation fuel) from/to the point of logistical support of the Navy of the Armed Forces of the russian federation at the ports "Tartus" and "Banyas" (Syria) ) and the port "Kavkaz" (russian federation) with the AIS signal turned off. The involvement of "Yaz", which belongs to the fleet of the russian sanctioned shipping company Transpetrochart LLC, in the supply of aviation fuel for the russian troops in Syria took place after the application of sanctions in September 2016 to JSC "Sovfracht" - one of the largest independent transport and forwarding companies of russia. which acts as a key node in the military transport network of russian cargo vessels that deliver North Korean weapons to military facilities, which are then transported to weapons depots on russia's western border for use in the war against Ukraine. The vessel has been making calls to the ports of TOT Crimea (Ukraine) since 2017, involved in the transportation of petroleum products from the port of Feodosia (TOT Crimea, Ukraine) to Syria (Tartus port) in February 2024, in December 2023 with AIS turned off. In September 2019, USA imposed sanctions on the vessel "Yaz".
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KOYSUG
Vessel name
KOYSUG
IMO
8883252
Flag (Current)
russian federation russian federation
Vessel Type
Chemical/Oil Products Tanker
Category
Cargo transportation from/to ТОТ of Ukraine
icon arrow-tree Calling ports of the TOT
The vessel has been implicated in the supply of jet fuel and other strategic cargoes to the Middle East for the russian armed forces’ contingent in Syria, acting in the interests of the Ministry of Defence of the russian federation (Министерство обороны российской федерации). It has made port calls at terminals in the temporarily occupied territory (TOT) of Ukraine, including the port of Crimea. In 2024, the tankers Azov (IMO 8943260), Koysug (IMO 8883252), and Nizami Ganjavi (IMO 9369617) were added to the list of vessels used by the russian federation for covert deliveries to Syria in the interests of the Ministry of Defence. Throughout 2024, these vessels were repeatedly deployed for voyages from Black Sea ports of the russian federation to Syria, following the established concealment pattern of disabling Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders in the Mediterranean Sea, either north or south of Cyprus, to obscure port entries and departures in Syria. Aviation fuel and diesel were shipped from russian ports, including the port of Azov, while petrol was supplied from Iran. These measures were adopted by the russian federation following successful 2023 Ukrainian Defence Forces strikes on the russian tanker Sig in the Black Sea, which had been engaged in transporting jet fuel to Syria for the russian military contingent.
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Nizami Ganjavi
Vessel name
Nizami Ganjavi
IMO
9369617
Flag (Current)
russian federation russian federation
Vessel Type
Chemical/Oil Products Tanker
Category
Cargo transportation from/to ТОТ of Ukraine
icon arrow-tree Calling ports of the TOT
It is involved in the supply of jet fuel and other important cargo to the Middle East (to the group of Russian troops in Syria in the interests of the russian Ministry of Defence), and calls at the ports of the TOT of Ukraine (in particular, the port of Crimea). In 2024, three tankers ‘Azov’ (IMO 8943260), ‘Koysug’ (IMO 8883252), and ‘Nizami Ganjavi’ (IMO 9369617) were added to the list of vessels used by the russian federation to make covert deliveries to Syria in the interests of the russian ministry of defence. During 2024, the vessels were repeatedly used by the russian federation to carry out maritime transportation from the black sea ports of the russian federation to Syria under the traditional scheme of concealing entries/exits to/from ports in Syria by switching off their transponders in the Mediterranean north or south of Cyprus. Aviation fuel and diesel were supplied to Syria from russian ports (Azov port), petrol - from Iran. Such steps were taken by Russia after the successful attacks in 2023 by the Ukrainian Defence Forces against the russian tanker ‘Sig’ in the Black Sea, which was carrying out sea transport to Syria to supply jet fuel to the russian troops in Syria. From July 20, 2025, the EU imposed sanctions on a tanker for transporting crude oil/petroleum products that originate in russia or are exported from russia using irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organization General Assembly resolution A.1192 (33). On August 12, 2025, Switzerland imposed sanctions on the vessel.
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RANGLER
Vessel name
RANGLER
IMO
9206671
Flag (Current)
Cameroon Cameroon
Vessel Type
Crude Oil Tanker
Category
Cargo transportation from/to ТОТ of Ukraine
icon arrow-tree Calling ports of the TOT
During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price-cap policy on russian oil, the tanker is involved in the export of oil to third countries from russian ports in the Baltic Sea, transshipment of russian oil from ship to ship in the area of anchorages in Greece and Malta. The transshipment of oil from ship to ship off the coast of Greece and Malta is reminiscent of the activities of the so-called 'STS hubs' that emerged several years ago in the UAE, Oman and Malaysia in response to USA sanctions against Venezuelan and Iranian oil. This methodology is aimed at concealing the origin, ownership and final destination of questionable cargo. The tanker resorts to the practice of turning off the AIS signal, conducting so-called 'dark activities', in particular in the Baltic Sea. The tanker calls at ports in TOT Crimea, Ukraine, in particular, in May 2025, the vessel called at the port of Komysh-Burun. The owner and commercial manager of the vessel is Ethereal Harbor Corp, a company registered in the Seychelles. The ISM manager of the tanker is Harmony Voyage Shipmanagement, a Kazakh company. The fleet of these companies consists only of the tanker ІМО 9206671. Against the backdrop of sanctions, russia is using a scheme of 'juggling' ships between related companies to conceal oil exports outside the price cap and other restrictions, as well as to hide the real owners of ships, and to ensure unimpeded transportation of fossil fuels by a 'shadow' fleet of outdated oil tankers, creates new companies for these purposes (in the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Turkey, Mauritius, Seychelles, and other jurisdictions) with non-transparent organizational and ownership structures. In order to implement this scheme, technical/commercial management and ship owners are constantly changing, and vessels are renamed with a change of flag, MMSI, call-sign, including for sanctioned vessels. Shadow fleet vessels operate under 'convenient flags', which allows them to conceal their true origin and avoid control by international organizations and insurance companies. The international non-governmental organization Greenpeace classifies tanker IMO 9206671 as part of russia's shadow fleet. The shadow fleet of russia, transporting huge volumes of crude oil through heavily trafficked routes through narrow straits close to the coastline, without proper P&I insurance, with automatic identification systems disabled, threatens an environmental disaster with significant economic costs to be borne by the affected coastal countries and/or the international community. Tshadow fleet' continues to generate billions of dollars in revenue for the Kremlin bypassing sanctions, disguising its activities under the flags of third countries, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant environmental threats with significant economic costs to coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequate insurance of shadow fleet tankers. On April 11, 2025, Ukraine imposed sanctions on the master of vessel IMO 9206671. On May 20, 2025, the EU imposed sanctions, which enter into force on May 21, 2025, on the tanker for the transportation of crude oil/petroleum products originating in or exported from russia, using irregular high-risk shipping practices as specified in the International Maritime Organization General Assembly Resolution A.1192(33). On June 03, 2025, the sanctions imposed by Switzerland on the vessel came into force. On July 21, 2025, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on the vessel.
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ASCENDANT
Vessel name
ASCENDANT
IMO
9248801
Flag (Current)
unknown
Vessel Type
Oil Products Tanker
Category
Cargo transportation from/to ТОТ of Ukraine
icon arrow-tree Calling ports of the TOT
The tanker is involved in the export of russian oil to third countries, in systematic violations of the G7+ oil embargo on russian oil in 2023-2024, in particular in the export of russian oil from russian ports in the Black Sea to the Laconikos Gulf, to the west of the island of Kithira. The vessel calls at the ports of the Crimean TOT of Ukraine. In January and March 2023, the tanker was involved in the export of several batches of oil products from the russian port of Tuapse, the shipper of the cargo was the sanctioned PJSC Oil Company Rosneft, the recipients were the sanctioned companies Petrokim Trading Middle East and Asia DMCC (Voliton DMCC, UAE), Guron Trading Limited (Hong Kong). There is a production complex in Tuapse belonging to the sanctioned Rosneft - the Tuapse Refinery with a marine terminal. In 2025, the vessel continues to call at russian ports with oil terminals, including Nakhodka and Slavyanka. The vessel is affiliated with the Indian company Gatik Ship Management and the Turkish company Unic Tanker Gemi Isletmeciligi, which is affiliated with Gatik. In 2022, the Indian company Gatik Ship Management became the largest carrier of russian oil and was used to operate the russian 'shadow' fleet under sanctions. On December 17, 2024, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on a vessel in connection with the transportation of oil or oil products originating in russia or from russia to a third country.  On February 21, 2025, Canada imposed sanctions on the vessel. On May 20, 2025, the EU imposed sanctions, which enter into force on May 21, 2025, on the tanker for the transportation of crude oil/petroleum products originating in or exported from russia, using irregular high-risk shipping practices as specified in the International Maritime Organization General Assembly Resolution A.1192(33). On June 03, 2025, the sanctions imposed by Switzerland on the vessel came into force. In June 2025, Australia imposed sanctions on the vessel.
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War & Sanctions 2025
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