Sea vessels

The vessel is involved in the theft of Ukrainian grain from the ports of Sevastopol, Feodosia, Kerch (TOT Crimea, Ukraine) with AIS disabled and its transportation to Turkey and the russian port of Kavkaz. In particular, on 04-06 January 2024, the vessel loaded 3,000 tonnes of wheat at a grain terminal in the temporarily occupied Sevastopol, then delivered it to the anchorage of the port of Kavkaz for a bulk carrier bound for Indonesia. The vessel is also involved in the supply of Turkish construction mixtures to the occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian court served a notice of suspicion to the ship's captain and arrested the vessel in absentia.

The vessel is involved in the theft of Ukrainian grain (corn, barley) from the ports of Sevastopol and Kerch (TOT Crimea, Ukraine) with AIS disabled and its export, in particular to the port of Kavkaz for transshipment, the Turkish port of Samsun. In 2019-2020, the vessel was also involved in schemes to deliver Ukrainian ilmenite concentrate to the TOT of Crimea for the Ukrainian titanium plant Krymskiy Titan, which was seized by russia, when the concentrate was delivered from Odesa (Ukraine) to Turkey. In Turkey, the ilmenite was loaded onto a vessel, which delivered it to the port of Kamysh-Burun (TOT Crimea) with the AIS turned off.

The vessel is involved in the scheme of stealing and exporting Ukrainian grain from the temporarily occupied Crimea to Turkey by reloading in a russian port the stolen Ukrainian grain previously exported from the TOT Crimea by the ‘Akubens’ vessel (IMO 8891364). The ‘Sword Lion’ arrived in the Kerch Strait with a draft of 6 metres from the Turkish port of Karadeniz Ereğli on 02 July 2023, stayed there until 27 July 2023, after which, having changed the draft to 9.6 metres, it proceeded to the outer harbour of the port of Haifa. The recipient of the agricultural products loaded onto the vessel was the Israeli company ADM Industries Centers ltd (Beit Dagan). According to the official data of this company, the ‘Sword Lion’ vessel delivered a cargo of barley with the status of origin as European, which was not true. The vessel arrived at the outer roadstead of the port of Haifa on 03 August 2023, but did not enter the port. This was likely due to the disclosure of the scheme to steal Ukrainian grain. From 09 to 10 August 2023, the vessel sailed to the coast of Cyprus and entered the outer roads of the port of Famagusta, where it stayed until 15 August 2023 without calling at the port, probably for the same reasons. After that, the vessel moved to the roadstead of the Turkish port of Iskanderun, where, after waiting for six days with AIS turned off, it entered the port and unloaded grain at the berth of a subsidiary of the russian Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Plant.

During the G7 and EU oil embargo and price-cap policy on russian oil, the tanker is involved in the export of russian oil to third countries from russian ports in the Black and Baltic seas. The tanker 'ANDAMAN SKIES' is certified by the Chinese regulator China Classification Society (IACS). Since January 2023, the vessel has been owned by an unknown company, Durbeen Navigation LTD, whose fleet consists only of the tanker 'ANDAMAN SKIES'. Since November 2023, the vessel's manager has been Alqutb Alshamali Marine Services LLC (UAE), affiliated with one of the leading operators of the so-called 'shadow' fleet, Radiating World Shipping Services LLC (UAE, under United Kingdom sanctions). At the beginning of 2023, Radiating World Shipping Services LLC was one of the three largest carriers of russian oil, along with Fractal Marine Shipping (UAE) and Gatik Ship Management (India). At that time, the fleet of Fractal Marine Shipping, Radiating World Shipping Services and Gatik Ship Management consisted of about 90 tankers, 90% of which transported oil and oil products from the Baltic and Black Sea ports of russia to India, China, Turkey, the Middle East, Africa and South America. In order to circumvent the sanctions, Radiating World Shipping Services 're-registered' its fleet to related companies, in particular Alqutb Ashamali Marine Services (as of October 30, 2024, only one tanker, 'Turbo Voyager' (IMO 9299898, under United Kingdom sanctions since October 17, 2024), remained in the management of Alqutb Ashamali Marine Services). Tankers operated/managed by Radiating World Shipping Services LLC continue to be used by related companies and call at russian ports. As sanctions are being imposed, russia uses a scheme of 'juggling' ships between related companies to conceal oil exports outside the price cap and other restrictions, as well as to hide the real owners of ships, and to ensure unimpeded transportation of fossil fuels by a 'shadow' fleet of obsolete oil tankers, creates new companies for these purposes (in the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Turkey, Mauritius, Seychelles, and other jurisdictions) with non-transparent organizational and ownership structures. In order to implement this scheme, technical/commercial management and ship owners are constantly changing, and vessels are renamed with a change of flag, MMSI, call-sign, including for sanctioned vessels. Shadow fleet vessels operate under “convenient flags”, which allows them to conceal their true origin and avoid control by international organizations and insurance companies. The 'shadow' fleet, transporting huge volumes of crude oil through heavily trafficked routes through narrow straits close to the coastline, without proper P&I insurance, with automatic identification systems disabled, threatens an environmental disaster with significant economic costs to be borne by the affected coastal countries and/or the international community. The recent incidents off Malaysia only underscore the need for swift action to curb the potentially devastating impact of the growing 'shadow fleet'. 'Shadow' tankers have already been involved in 50 incidents from the Danish Straits all the way to Malaysia since russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to CREA, from January to August 2024, the number of shadow tankers crossing the Danish Straits in Europe increased by 277% compared to the same period in 2022, with 64% of the 46 million tons of russian marine oil transported through the Danish Straits being transported by shadow tankers. In the same period, the number of shadow tankers in the Straits of Dover and Gibraltar increased by 355% compared to 2022, transporting 67% of the 37 million tons of oil through the straits. The Suez Canal experienced a staggering 649% increase in shadow tanker traffic, with 69% of the 52 million tons of russian crude oil passing through it being transported by these vessels. Thus, the 'shadow fleet' of the russian federation continues to provide multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin bypassing sanctions, disguising its activities under the flags of third countries, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant threats to environmental safety with significant economic costs for coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequate insurance of shadow fleet tankers.

During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price-cap policy on russian oil, the tanker is involved in the export of russian oil to third countries from russian ports, in particular in the Baltic Sea, including with the AIS disabled. The tanker is affiliated with Galena Ship Management and Ark Seakonnect Shipmanagment, which were the former ISM managers of the vessel in 2023. Galena Ship Management, Ark Seakonnect Shipmanagement are among a number of other companies involved in the 'juggling' of shadow fleet vessels associated with the Indian company Gatik Ship Management, one of the leading operators of the so-called 'shadow' fleet, which has become the largest carrier of russian oil under sanctions since the beginning of the full-scale war against Ukraine. The constant change of owners and managers of vessels to avoid sanctions and conceal the true beneficiaries of the vessels is a typical phenomenon for the 'shadow' fleet involved in the russian oil and oil products trade. On October 17, 2024, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on tankers of the russian so-called 'shadow' fleet, including the tanker 'ANTAEUS', in connection with the transportation of russian oil and/or oil products from russia to third countries.

The vessel is involved in the theft of Ukrainian grain from the Avlita grain terminal in the temporarily occupied Sevastopol (TOT Crimea, Ukraine) in July, August2022 for transshipment to the russian port of Kavkaz, as well as from the port of Kerch (TOT Crimea, Ukraine). The Ukrainian court served the captain of the vessel with a notice of suspicion. The captain of the vessel made seven calls to the closed commercial seaports of Sevastopol and Kerch (TOT Crimea) to load the looted Ukrainian grain, periodically turned off the AIS and entered fictitious information about the course of the vessel, which was allegedly heading to russian ports, rather than to the closed seaports of TOT Crimea. The Turkish agricultural company Bek Tarim, the russian company Fast LLC (TIN: 2376000774), and Petrokhleb-Kuban LLC (TIN: 2310109650) are involved in the export of Ukrainian grain by ship. The vessel is managed by Kuban Marine Company LLC (TIN: 2310213041), a russian company affiliated with Petrokhleb-Kuban LLC. Kuban Maritime Company operates three other vessels that make illegal voyages to the closed ports of the TOT of Crimea. The vessel was also involved in a scheme to smuggle ilmenite with AIS disabled for the Crimean Titanium plant seized by the TOT of Crimea through overloading in the Black Sea for delivery to the port of Kerch (TOT of Crimea). The vessel has been in violation of Ukrainian law and the so-called ‘Crimean sanctions’ since 2015. The vessel has been making numerous calls to the port of Kerch (TOT Crimea) since 2015, including a raid transshipment in the Kerch Strait.

The vessel is involved in the theft of sheet metal scrap from the metallurgical plant Azovstal (TOT of Mariupol, Donetsk region, Ukraine) and its importation to Rostov-on-Don (russia), in particular, accompanied by two russian artillery boats of project 1204 ‘Shmil’. The vessel was also involved in the importation of concrete fortifications for the russian army's defences to the TOT of Ukraine (Mariupol) with the AIS signal disabled.

The vessel is involved in a scheme to steal Ukrainian grain from the TOT of Ukraine by receiving grain from other vessels anchored in the Kerch Strait near the TOT of Crimea. The vessel attempted to transport the grain (barley) obtained in this way to the port of Samsun in Turkey. In April 2023, the Ukrainian Party requested the Turkish Party to arrest the vessel, take grain samples and interrogate the captain and crew. The vessel was not arrested and was not accepted in the Turkish port.

It is involved in the export of russian coal from the rosterminalugol coal terminal in the port of Ust-Luga to the port of Eren (Turkey). Since December 2022, as part of the expansion of sanctions against the energy sector of the russian federation, the EU has banned imports of all types of russian coal. According to the CREA, from 05 December 2022 to the end of June 2024, China purchased 45% of all russian coal exports, India (18%), and South Korea (10%).

During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price-cap policy on russian oil, the tanker is involved in the export of russian crude oil to third countries from russian ports, including with the AIS system turned off. Since March 01, 2024, the owner and commercial manager of the tanker is an unknown company Campana Shipping Inc (Mauritius), the ISM manager is the Indian company Meegaman Maritime PVT LTD. The fleet of the shipowner and ISM-manager consists only of the tanker 'THESEUS' (IMO 9304825). The tanker is certified by the Indian regulator Indian Register of Shipping (IACS). The tanker 'THESEUS' is affiliated with the Indian company Gatik Ship Management, one of the leading operators of the so-called 'shadow fleet', which has become the largest carrier of russian oil under sanctions since the beginning of the full-scale war between russia and Ukraine. Tankers operated/managed by India's Gatik Ship Management continue to be used by related companies and call at russian ports. As sanctions are being imposed, russia uses a scheme of "juggling" ships between related companies to conceal oil exports outside the price cap and other restrictions, as well as to hide the real owners of ships, and to ensure unimpeded transportation of fossil fuels by a 'shadow' fleet of obsolete oil tankers, creates new companies for these purposes (in the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Turkey, Mauritius, Seychelles, and other jurisdictions) with non-transparent organizational and ownership structures. In order to implement this scheme, technical/commercial management and ship owners are constantly changing, and vessels are renamed with a change of flag, MMSI, call-sign, including for sanctioned vessels. Shadow fleet vessels operate under “convenient flags”, which allows them to conceal their true origin and avoid control by international organizations and insurance companies. Almost all vessels that are involved in the transportation of russian oil by the shadow fleet since 2022 have been certified by the Indian regulator Indian Register of Shipping (IACS). The certification of shadow fleet vessels allows the shipowner/operator to insure the vessels, which, in turn, allows the vessels to enter ports and pass through various specific sea routes (straits, canals, etc.). The 'shadow' fleet, transporting huge volumes of crude oil through heavily trafficked routes through narrow straits close to the coastline, without proper P&I insurance, with automatic identification systems disabled, threatens an environmental disaster with significant economic costs to be borne by the affected coastal countries and/or the international community. The recent incidents off Malaysia only underscore the need for swift action to curb the potentially devastating impact of the growing 'shadow fleet'. 'Shadow' tankers have already been involved in 50 incidents from the Danish Straits all the way to Malaysia since russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to CREA, from January to August 2024, the number of shadow tankers crossing the Danish Straits in Europe increased by 277% compared to the same period in 2022, with 64% of the 46 million tons of russian marine oil transported through the Danish Straits being transported by shadow tankers. In the same period, the number of shadow tankers in the Straits of Dover and Gibraltar increased by 355% compared to 2022, transporting 67% of the 37 million tons of oil through the straits. The Suez Canal experienced a staggering 649% increase in shadow tanker traffic, with 69% of the 52 million tons of russian crude oil passing through it being transported by these vessels. Thus, the 'shadow fleet' of the russian federation continues to provide multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin bypassing sanctions, disguising its activities under the flags of third countries, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant threats to environmental safety with significant economic costs for coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequate insurance of shadow fleet tankers.

During the period of the G7 and EU oil embargo and the price-cap policy on russian crude oil, the tanker is involved in the export of russian crude oil to third countries from russian ports, including with the AIS system disabled. The owner and commercial manager of the tanker since April 01, 2024 is an unknown company Aquaflow Marine FZE (UAE), whose fleet consists of only one oil tanker 'THALASSA'. The ISM-manager of the tanker is Maple Maritime Solutions FZE (UAE), which manages another tanker 'MERCURY' (IMO 9319870), affiliated with the Indian Gatik Ship Management. The tanker is certified by the Indian regulator Indian Register of Shipping (IACS). The tanker 'THALASSA' is affiliated with the Indian company Galena Ship Management, which is one of a number of other companies involved in the practice of 'juggling' vessels associated with the Indian Gatik Ship Management, one of the leading operators of the so-called 'shadow fleet', which has become the largest carrier of russian oil under sanctions since the beginning of russia's full-scale war against Ukraine. Tankers operated/managed by India's Gatik Ship Management continue to be used by related companies and call at russian ports. As sanctions are being imposed, russia uses a scheme of "juggling" ships between related companies to conceal oil exports outside the price cap and other restrictions, as well as to hide the real owners of ships, and to ensure unimpeded transportation of fossil fuels by a 'shadow' fleet of obsolete oil tankers, creates new companies for these purposes (in the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Turkey, Mauritius, Seychelles, and other jurisdictions) with non-transparent organizational and ownership structures. In order to implement this scheme, technical/commercial management and ship owners are constantly changing, and vessels are renamed with a change of flag, MMSI, call-sign, including for sanctioned vessels. Shadow fleet vessels operate under “convenient flags”, which allows them to conceal their true origin and avoid control by international organizations and insurance companies. Almost all vessels that are involved in the transportation of russian oil by the shadow fleet since 2022 have been certified by the Indian regulator Indian Register of Shipping (IACS). The certification of shadow fleet vessels allows the shipowner/operator to insure the vessels, which, in turn, allows the vessels to enter ports and pass through various specific sea routes (straits, canals, etc.). The 'shadow' fleet, transporting huge volumes of crude oil through heavily trafficked routes through narrow straits close to the coastline, without proper P&I insurance, with automatic identification systems disabled, threatens an environmental disaster with significant economic costs to be borne by the affected coastal countries and/or the international community. The recent incidents off Malaysia only underscore the need for swift action to curb the potentially devastating impact of the growing 'shadow fleet'. 'Shadow' tankers have already been involved in 50 incidents from the Danish Straits all the way to Malaysia since russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to CREA, from January to August 2024, the number of shadow tankers crossing the Danish Straits in Europe increased by 277% compared to the same period in 2022, with 64% of the 46 million tons of russian marine oil transported through the Danish Straits being transported by shadow tankers. In the same period, the number of shadow tankers in the Straits of Dover and Gibraltar increased by 355% compared to 2022, transporting 67% of the 37 million tons of oil through the straits. The Suez Canal experienced a staggering 649% increase in shadow tanker traffic, with 69% of the 52 million tons of russian crude oil passing through it being transported by these vessels. Thus, the 'shadow fleet' of the russian federation continues to provide multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin bypassing sanctions, disguising its activities under the flags of third countries, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant threats to environmental safety with significant economic costs for coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequate insurance of shadow fleet tankers.

During the period of the G7 embargo and price-cap policy on russian oil, the tanker was involved in the export of russian oil from the russian ports of Ust-Luga and Primorsk, mainly to China, India, and Egypt, and resorted to the practice of turning off the AIS signal and conducting so-called 'dark activities' at sea. The vessel is certified by the Korean Register (IACS). The oil tanker is affiliated with OPEC Petrol Transportation Co Ltd (Vietnam) as the former owner and commercial manager of the vessel. This company is associated with the trade of Iranian and Venezuelan oil in 2021 with its own fleet. The tanker 'MIKATI' calls at russian ports that are leading in the export of russian oil by the shadow fleet - the ports of Ust-Luga, Primorsk in the Baltic Sea, delivering oil to the countries that import the most russian crude oil through the shadow fleet - China, India. The 'shadow' fleet, transporting huge volumes of crude oil through heavily trafficked routes through narrow straits near the coastline, without proper P&I insurance, with the automatic identification system turned off, threatens an environmental disaster with significant economic costs to be borne by the affected coastal countries and/or the international community. The recent incidents off Malaysia only underscore the need for swift action to curb the potentially devastating impact of the growing 'shadow fleet'. 'Shadow' tankers have already been involved in 50 incidents from the Danish Straits to Malaysia since russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to CREA, from January to August 2024, the number of shadow tankers crossing the Danish Straits in Europe increased by 277% compared to the same period in 2022, with 64% of the 46 million tons of russian marine oil transported through the Danish Straits being transported by shadow tankers. In the same period, the number of shadow tankers in the Straits of Dover and Gibraltar increased by 355% compared to 2022, transporting 67% of the 37 million tons of oil through the straits. The Suez Canal experienced a staggering 649% increase in shadow tanker traffic, with 69% of the 52 million tons of russian crude oil passing through it being transported by these vessels. Thus, russia's 'shadow fleet' continues to generate multibillion-dollar revenues for the kremlin bypassing sanctions, disguising its activities under the flags of third countries, using complex schemes to conceal owners, and poses significant environmental safety threats with significant economic costs to coastal countries and/or the international community due to the outdated and inadequate insurance of shadow fleet tankers.